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DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
AND ANTITRUST
Philip K. Maxwell*
Tim Labadie**
I.

DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
A.

CONSUMER STANDING

1. When is a bank customer a "consumer?"
a.

Loan transactions
NDERSTANDING the cases decided during the Survey period on

this issue requires a brief review of the DTPA's definition of "consumer" and the history of how Texas courts have applied it in suits
against financial institutions.
The DTPA's causes of action may be brought only by a "consumer," a
term the statute defines as one "who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease,
any goods or services."' Twelve years ago in Riverside National Bank v.
Lewis 2 the supreme court held, 5 to 4, that money is not within the definition
of "goods ' 3 and the extension of credit is not within the definition of "services."'4 The supreme court concluded that Lewis, who claimed his car was
repossessed because the defendant refused to loan him the money to pay off
his note at the repossessing bank, was not a "consumer." 5 The court did
mere extension of credit
indicate, however, that bank services other than the
6
services.
of
definition
DTPA's
the
within
may be
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1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987) (hereinafter all cites to the
statute will be to "DTPA § ").
2. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980).
3. DTPA § 17.45(1) (Vernon 1987) defines goods as "tangible chattels or real property
purchased or leased for use."
4. DTPA § 17.45(2) (Vernon 1987) states that " '[s]ervices' means work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or
repair of goods."
5. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 174-75.
6. The court noted that:
The argument that services existed in the lending of money, and in the process
of determining whether to lend money, and were necessarily a part of the inter-
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Two years later the court sharply limited the impact of Riverside in Knight
v. InternationalHarvester Credit Corp.7 In Knight, the defendant creditor
financed plaintiff's purchase of a truck using a form that contained a waiver
of the plaintiffs right to complain of late delivery of the truck, a provision
outlawed by the Texas Credit Code and hence actionable under DTPA section 17.46(b)(12). The court distinguished Riverside because in that case the
borrower sought only the extension of credit, whereas "Knight's objective in
the transaction was the purchase of a dump truck." Significantly, the plaintiff in Knight made no complaint about the truck; his sole complaint was
based on a DTPA violation in the credit document.
Further erosion of Riverside occurred a year later in Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co. 9 In Flenniken the bank was assigned a mechanic's
and materialman's lien contract that obligated a homebuilder to construct
the plaintiffs a house, which he failed to complete. Failing to reach agreement with the plaintiffs on what to do with the unfinished house, the bank
foreclosed, conduct that the jury found unconscionable under the DTPA.
The supreme court again distinguished Riverside, noting that there "the sole
basis of Lewis' complaint was the Bank's failure to lend him money as it had
promised it would [whereas] . . . the Flennikens did not seek to borrow
money; they sought to acquire a house. The house thus forms the basis of
their complaint."' 0
A year after Flenniken the court reaffirmed the limited effect of Riverside
in La Sara Grain Co. v. FirstNational Bank of Mercedes.1' In that case, La
Sara complained that the bank, through unauthorized transactions with
Jones, a La Sara employee, enabled Jones to embezzle over $300,000 of La
Sara's money. One such transaction was the bank permitting Jones to take
out a loan in La Sara's name and allowing him to deposit half the loan proceeds in his personal account. The bank sought sanctuary in Riverside, but
the court declined to provide it. Referring to Knight and Flenniken, the
court noted that it had "twice limited [Riverside] to its facts, emphasizing
that Lewis sought only the extension of credit from Riverside, and nothing
more."' 2 The court held that "a lender may be subject to a DTPA claim if
the borrower's 'objective' is the purchase or lease of a good or service
thereby qualifying the borrower as a consumer."' 13 In explaining why La
est rate or purchase price of the loan, is not supported by the evidence adduced at
trial. This argument, contained in briefs, is merely hypothetical. There is nothing to support it in the Statement of Facts.
603 S.W.2d at 175 (emphasis added).
7. 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982).
8. Id. at 389.
9. 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983).
10. Id. at 707-08.
11. 673 S.W.2d 558, 566-67 (Tex. 1984); see also, First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ritenour, 704 S.W.2d 895, 900 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding bank
client who acquired certificate of deposit and also purchased collateral financial counseling
services, paid for out of bank's profits, to be a consumer).
12. La Sara Grain, 673 S.W.2d at 566.
13. Id. at 567.
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Sara's proof did not meet this test, the court described the kind of evidence
that would:
Obviously, we cannot determine La Sara's objective concerning this
loan, because La Sara's complaint is that it did not authorize the transaction. There is no evidence, however, that Jones represented to the
bank that the loan was to purchase or lease goods or services, that the
bank thought the loan was for that purpose, or that the loan was one of
a series with which La Sara obtained goods or services. In fact, there is
no evidence that La Sara ever borrowed money from the bank for goods
or services. Because the loan involves only the extension of credit, La
Sara has not shown itself to be a consumer and therefore has no DTPA
claim. 14
Significantly, the court did not require that any complaint be leveled at the
good or service acquired with the loan proceeds; it was sufficient that acquisition of goods or services was the objective or result of the loan.
Because the objective of virtually all loans is to buy goods or services, La
Sara seemed a deathknell for Riverside in all but purely refinancing situations. In other words, Riverside appeared to have become less the rule than
the exception. Several courts during the Survey period, however, applied
Riverside to deny consumer standing. These courts either declined to follow
La Sara because of perceived differences in the facts or, more importantly,
by requiring, though La Sara did not, that there be some complaint about
the good or service to be acquired with the loan proceeds.
The court in Bank of El Paso v. TO. Stanley Boot Co. 15 held that a boot
manufacturer claiming the bank reneged on a promise to extend a $500,000
line of credit to pay operational expenses, was not a "consumer." 1 6 The
court acknowledged that La Sara grants consumer status "where there has
been a showing that the lender's extension of money was directly related to
acquiring goods or services," 1 7 but concluded, without any discussion of the
purpose to which the instant loan proceeds were to be put, that "the facts of
this case do not lend themselves to this interpretation." ' 8
In Central Texas Hardware, Inc. v. First City, Texas-Bryan, 19 Central
Texas Hardware, Inc. (CTHI) sued First City for breaching an oral commitment to loan CTHI money to buy seasonal inventory. Without even citing
La Sara, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not a "consumer" because there was no complaint regarding the inventory items that would have
20
been purchased if the bank had made the loan.
14. Id.
15. 809 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991) aff'd in part, modified on other grounds,
36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 259 (Dec. 2, 1992).
16. Stanley Boot, 809 S.W.2d at 288-289.

17. Id. at 289.
18. Id. The holding seems questionable in light of the evidence that expenses of operating
a boot manufacturing facility would obviously be for "services" (i.e., employee wages) and
"goods" (i.e., leather and other raw material for bootmaking). Indeed securing money to
purchase leather to make boots had been the explicit purpose of the plaintiff's prior loans with
the bank.
19. 810 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
20. Id. at 237. This holding is not only afoul of the supreme court's opinion in Knight,
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This reasoning was followed by the Fifth Circuit in Walker v. FDIC2 1 in
order to deny consumer standing to Walker because he was not complaining
about the goods he intended to purchase with the money he wanted to borrow from the bank, but about the bank's refusal to loan the money as promised. Walker, a real estate developer, sold an office building to Mainland
Savings Association for $1 million, plus, he said, the extension of a multimillion dollar development loan that would enable Walker to build a hotel.
The million dollars and the property were exchanged, but Mainland never
delivered on the $21 million loan. The court determined that Walker was
not a consumer because the transaction between him and the bank was a
"pure loan transaction" outside the scope of the DTPA.22 This was true,
according to the court, because Walker was not complaining about the hotel,
but about the bank not loaning him the money as promised. In reaching its
decision, the Fifth Circuit chose to follow Central Texas Hardware rather
than Security Bank v. Dalton.23 In Dalton, the court concluded that Dalton
was a consumer as to the bank because the loan sought was to build a funeral
home even though Dalton's complaint had nothing to do with the funeral
home.24 Instead, Dalton complained that the bank wrongfully dishonored
his checks, froze his accounts and failed to renew his note as promised.
Henderson v. Texas Commerce Bank-Midland25presented a Riverside set
of facts. Henderson alleged that Texas Commerce Bank (TCB) violated the
DTPA by failing to loan him money to refinance certain personal and business obligations then owing to InterFirst Bank. The court declined to accord Henderson consumer standing because he sought only to borrow
money to refinance his debts at InterFirst. 26 The court further held that
Henderson's only complaint was that TCB failed to make the loans and that
he made no complaint pertaining to any collateral service that TCB provided
27
or was to provide.
The answer to the confusion in the cases is for the supreme court to overrule Riverside as wrongly decided. Just as a bank depositor-whose status as
a consumer continues to be upheld by the courts-receives "services" from a
bank, so does a borrower. The correct analysis begins with the observation
that the banks are not lending their money, but rather their depositor's
money. As one critic of Riverside has explained:
Banks are not providers of credit, they are credit market intermediaries.
In economic terms, they borrow from savings surplus units (generally
households, in the form of deposits) and make these funds available to
deficit units. In so doing, they perform a variety of "services." They
discussed supra at text accompanying notes 7-8, it would effectively repeal the DTPA in refusal to loan cases because there never will be any complaint about goods or services never
purchased or acquired,
21. 970 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1992).

22. Id. at 123.
23. 803 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
24. Id. at 452-53.
25. 837 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).

26. Id. at 782.
27. Id.
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provide economies of scale not available to the individual borrower or
saver, thereby reducing transactions costs. A financial intermediary is
able to pool the savings of individual savers to lend funds more closely
tailored to the needs of the borrower, thus providing flexibility to the
borrower who would otherwise have to deal with a large number of
lenders. Financial intermediaries spread risks, which provides a higher
degree of liquidity to the saver. In summary, they channel funds from
the ultimate lender to the ultimate borrower at a lower cost, or with
more convenience, or both, than is possible with a direct loan from the
ultimate lender. When expressed in these terms, it is difficult
'2 to fathom
how seeking the use of money is not seeking a "service."
Thus, consumers who borrow from banks and other financial institutions are
no different from those who retain "loan brokers" to find them a loan.
There is no valid reason for holding, as the courts have, that the loan broker's customer is a "consumer" 29 and denying that status to the bank's
30
customer.
b. Services other than lending money
Texas courts continue to have no problem with the consumer standing of
bank depositors. In McDade v. Texas Commerce Bank 3 McDade, upon retiring from Texas Commerce Bank (TCB) after 27 years, deposited the funds
.he received from his TCB thrift plan into what the bank led him to believe
was a nontaxable retirement account. McDade later learned that the money
was put in a regular, taxable account. He sued the bank under the DTPA
and for negligence. McDade asserted that the bank breached an express
warranty that it would put his money in a nontaxable retirement account.
TCB, relying on Riverside, argued that McDade was not a "consumer," because he was not seeking goods or services. McDade relied on the holding in
La Sara that "the services provided by a bank in connection with a checking
account are within the scope of the DTPA. ' ' 32 The McDade court held that
this case more closely resembled La Sara than Riverside. "Here, McDade
was seeking to purchase the services TCB provided as an IRA trustee. McDade did more than seek to deposit money in an account; he sought to
purchase TCB's services as an IRA trustee."' 33 The court thus concluded
34
that McDade was a "consumer" under the DTPA.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in Cushman v. Resolution Trust Co. ,35 allowed
a purchaser of a certificate of deposit to sue the lending institution under the
28. Robert Wright, Banks and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, THE TEXAS
BANK LAWYER, Vol. 5, No. 9, February, 1982.
29. See Lubbock Mortgage & Inv. Co. v. Thomas, 626 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1981, no writ).
30. For a thorough analysis of the relationship between depositors, borrowers, and finan-

cial institutions and an incisive criticism of the holding in Riverside, see John Krahmer et al.,
Banks and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (1987).
31. 822 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
32. Id. at 719 (quoting La Sara, 673 S.W.2d at 564).

33. McDade, 822 S.W.2d at 719.
34. Id.
35. 954 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1992).
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36 that a savDTPA, adopting the holding in Plaza NationalBank v. Walker
37
DTPA.
the
under
ings account depositor is a "consumer"

2. The plaintiffis relationship to the transaction, not the defendant,
determines standing as a "consumer."
It has long been held that there is no privity requirement in the DTPA,
and that a plaintiff's "consumer" standing is determined by his relationship
to the transaction-i.e., did he seek or acquire goods or services-and not
his relationship to the defendant. 38 It has also long been the law that the
"consumer" need not himself have purchased the good or service; it is suffi39
cient that he acquired or sought to acquire either.
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit applied these principles in
Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.40 to allow a DTPA suit to be brought on
behalf of Bobby Wellborn, a teenager who was killed when a defective garage door opener that his mother had purchased failed to raise the door
when it came into contact with him. Sears argued that Bobby was merely an
"incidental user" and not a "consumer" under the DTPA because he neither
sought nor acquired the garage door opener. As a starting point for its analysis on this issue, the court noted that the terms of the DTPA are to be
liberally construed in order to protect consumers from any deceptive trade
practice. 4' The court then noted that direct contractual privity is not a consideration in determining consumer status; it is established by the plaintiff's
relationship to the transaction, his seeking or acquiring "goods" or "services," not on his contractual relationship with the defendant. 42 The court
concluded that, "[a]lthough Bobby did not enter into a contractual relationship with the defendants, he acquired the garage door opener and the benefits it provided ....
[T]he garage door opener ... was purchased for his
benefit, installed in his home, and used by him. ... "43 Consequently, he
was a "consumer" for purposes of the DTPA.44
A similar result was reached in Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan.45 This suit
arose out of the Alton school bus tragedy, which occurred on September 21,
1989. Perez was employed by Valley Coca-Cola as a truck driver. On the
morning of the accident, Perez attempted to stop his truck at a stop sign but
the brakes failed causing the truck to collide with a school bus. The loaded
bus was knocked into a caliche pit and twenty-one children died. Perez suffered injuries from the collision and was taken to a local hospital to be
treated. The next day, Kirk & Carrigan, lawyers who had been hired to
represent Valley Coca-Cola, visited Perez in the hospital in order to take his
36. 767 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied).
37. 954 F.2d at 327.
38. See Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tex. 1981).

39. See Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1985).
40. 970 F.2d 1420 (5th Cir. 1992).
41. Id. at 1426.

42. Id.
43. Id. at 1426-27.
44. Id.

45. 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
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statement before a court reporter. Perez claimed that the lawyers told him
that they were his lawyers also and that anything he told them would be
kept confidential. With this understanding, Perez gave them a sworn statement concerning the accident. Only after this visit did Kirk & Carrigan
make arrangements for a criminal defense attorney to represent Perez. This
attorney was paid by National Union, which covered both Valley Coca-Cola
and Perez for liability in connection with the accident.
Sometime later, Kirk & Carrigan, without telling Perez or his criminal
defense attorney, turned Perez's statement over to the district attorney's office. Perez claimed that partly on the basis of this statement, the district
attorney was able to obtain a grand jury indictment of Perez for involuntary
manslaughter for his actions in connection with the accident. Perez sued
Kirk & Carrigan along with Valley Coca-Cola, other Coca-Cola entities, and
National Union. Perez asserted numerous causes of action against Kirk &
Carrigan, including breach of fiduciary duty, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the DTPA and the Insurance
Code. Kirk & Carrigan moved for summary judgment on all of Perez's
claims on the grounds that no attorney/client or other fiduciary relationship
existed, and that even if such a relationship existed, no damages resulted
from the asserted breach. Moreover, Kirk & Carrigan argued that Perez's
claims were, in actuality, claims for malicious prosecution, that Perez was
not a "consumer" under the DTPA, and that Perez failed to state a cause of
action under the Insurance Code. The trial court granted the summary
judgment and rendered judgment that Perez take nothing on his claims
against Kirk & Carrigan. Perez appealed and the court of appeals reversed
and remanded.

46

The court rejected Kirk & Carrigan's position that Perez was not a consumer under the DTPA because he did not seek their services, holding that
it was not required that Perez pay for the legal services he received from
Kirk & Carrigan to be a consumer under the DTPA. 47 The summary judgment evidence showed that Perez acquired the services of Kirk & Carrigan
who were paid by Valley Coca-Cola or its insurer, National Union. According to the court, "[s]imply because those services were actually purchased by
someone else does not disqualify Perez from claiming to be a consumer
for
48
purposes of his DTPA claim against the provider of those services."
The foregoing cases are difficult to reconcile with the result reached in
Hernandez v. Kasco Ventures, Inc.49 Kasco leased a warehouse to Miles for
storage purposes. In order to allow Miles to load and unload freight, Kasco
equipped the warehouse with dock levelers. Miles soon began experiencing
various problems with the dock levelers, and pursuant to Kasco's request,
the manufacturer reportedly repaired them. Hernandez, a Miles' warehouseman, was injured because of a malfunctioning dock leveler. Her46. Id. at 268.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 832 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
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nandez sued Kasco under the theories of negligence, warranty, strict
liability, and deceptive trade practices. Hernandez alleged that as the landlord, Kasco was responsible for the dock levelers. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment as to Hernandez's DTPA cause of action
finding that he was not a "consumer" because, according to the court, he
"did not request or ask for the goods" 50 and "never owned the dock
levelers."5"i
The Corpus Christi court also recently refused to grant consumer status to
a person because he, in the court's view, did not have a relationship to a sales
transaction. Lara v. Lile52 was brought on behalf of the estate of Lara who
was killed when a truck, under which he had sought refuge from the rain,
ran over him. At the time, Lara worked for Heldenfels Brothers, Inc., which
was working on a road construction job site. Lile owned Raven Transport
and Raven Supply, which contracted with Heldenfels to deliver concrete
boxes to be used in the construction of drainage culverts at the site. When a
sudden rainstorm began, Lara ran under the fiat-bed portion of a Raven
Supply truck to escape the rain. A few minutes later, a Raven employee
moved the truck forward, killing Lara. Celia Lara, individually and as next
friend of Lara's children, and on behalf of the estate of Raul Lara, brought
suit against Heldenfels and Lile. In addition to asserting a cause of action
for wrongful death, the Laras brought an action for violation of the DTPA.
The court recognized that a "consumer" under the DTPA is:
one who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease any goods or services.
The plaintiff establishes his standing as a consumer in terms of his relationship to the transaction, not by a contractual relationship with the
defendant. Thus, the plaintiff may acquire
goods or services purchased
53
by another for the plaintiff's benefit.
Even so, the court stated, "a person who has no relationship to the sales
transaction may not be a consumer under the DTPA."'54 The court then
considered what goods or services Mr. Lara received or acquired from
Raven, the trucking company owned by Lile. According to the court, the
only service performed by the trucking firm was the transportation of culverts from one location to another. Raven's trucking service was not sought,
received, or acquired by Lara, nor did it benefit Lara. The only connection
between Lara and Raven consisted of both parties performing work for
Heldenfels, Lara as an employee and Raven as a subcontractor. The court
thus held that Lara was not a "consumer" of Raven's services and affirmed
55
the granting of the special exceptions.
50. Id. at 634. That the plaintiff need not "request or ask" for the goods or services to be
a "consumer" is the holding of the cases discussed infra under the heading "Involuntary acquisition of services."
51. Id.
52. 828 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
53. Id. at 541 (citations omitted) (quoting DTPA § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987)).
54. Id. at 542.
55. Id.
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3. Goods or services forming the basis of the complaint
The requirement that to be a "consumer" the goods or services sought or
acquired must "form the basis of the complaint" was first announced in
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc.,56 a suit by homebuyers against the
seller's real estate agent, who misrepresented the number of square feet in
the house. The court of appeals found no consumer standing because the
buyers had not sought or acquired services from the seller's agent. 57 The
supreme court reversed, holding that it is unnecessary that the plaintiff seek
or acquire goods furnished by the defendant. 58 Though not accepting the
buyers' contention that they had sought or acquired the services of the
seller's agent, the court held it enough that the buyers' complaint was based
on the home, which was covered by the DTPA's definition of "goods." 59
The "form the basis of the complaint" requirement was used in three cases
in the Survey period to deny consumer standing. Two of these cases, Central
Texas Hardware,Inc. v. FirstCity, Texas-Bryan6° and Walker v. FDIC,61 are
discussed above under the heading, "When is a bank customer a 'consumer'?" 62 In the third case, Lochabay v. Southwestern Bell Media, Inc.,63
Bell contracted with Lochabay, an attorney, to publish his advertisement in
the Yellow Pages. Lochabay furnished to Bell a copy of the advertisement
he wanted to publish. No Bell employee assisted Lochabay or suggested
improvements in the advertisement. When Bell sued to collect for the advertisement, Lochabay contended that Bell had violated DTPA section
17.46(b)(23) by failing to inform him of defects in the design and layout of
his advertisement. The court of appeals concluded that Lochabay was not a
"consumer" under the DTPA because the service he sought and purchased
from Bell, that of publishing his advertisement, did not form the basis of his
complaint. 64 The court viewed Lochabay's complaint as being that Bell
never provided or undertook to provide advice respecting the quality of his
advertisement rather than the publishing of his advertisement. 65
4.

Third party beneficiaries of insurancepolicies and "consumer" standing

In Watson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 66 Ms. Watson was involved in a car
wreck with Mr. Townley, who was insured by Allstate. After getting less
than satisfactory treatment of the claim she made upon Allstate for the damages caused by Townley, Watson sued Allstate under the DTPA (and for
other causes of action) without first getting a judgment against Townley or
56.
57.
Worth
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981).
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 680, 683-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
1980), rev'd, 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981).
618 S.W.2d at 540-41.
Id. See definition of "goods" supra note 3.
810 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
970 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1992).
See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
828 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
Id. at 172.
Id.
828 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ granted).
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otherwise establishing his legal responsibility for the wreck. The trial court
granted a summary judgment in Allstate's favor, ruling that Watson was not
a consumer.
On appeal, Watson argued that while she did not seek by purchase the
benefits of insurance, she did acquire such benefits as they are mandated by
the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Watson compared her
situation to that presented in Kennedy v. Sale,67 where the supreme court
held that an employee whose employer purchased insurance on his behalf
was a consumer since he "acquired" the insurance services. 68 The court of
appeals held, however, that Watson was not a consumer because she sought
only insurance proceeds and these are not goods or services. 69 The court
also seemed to place some amount of importance on the fact that Watson
was an unknown intended beneficiary, rather than a known beneficiary, as
was the case in Kennedy v. Sale.70 The court's reasoning is inconsistent with
HOW Insurance Co. v. PatriotFinancialServices, Inc.,71 which held that a
condominium purchaser was a consumer with respect to an insurer who insured the performance of the builder.72 The court found that the condominium owner "acquired the services provided by HOW when she purchased
the condominium. That [she] did not personally purchase the insurance is of
no consequence."'7 3 The same is true of Ms. Watson. She acquired the services provided by Allstate when Mr. Townley collided with her car. That Ms.
Watson was an unknown beneficiary at the time Mr. Townley purchased the
insurance should be of no consequence since it was known that all individuals who Mr. Townley injured by the negligent use of his car were the intended beneficiaries of his insurance, insurance that is mandated by statute
for the protection of such people.
5. Involuntary acquisition of services
On two occasions the Dallas court of appeals has held that a person who
involuntarily acquires services is a consumer under the DTPA. Both cases
were brought by men who had their cars towed by a towing service even
74
though the cars were legally parked. In Allied Towing Service v. Mitchell,
John Mitchell parked his BMW in a lot, owned by Decorators Anonymous,
located near the Royal Rack pool hall. Royal Rack had a contractual agreement with Decorators allowing Royal Rack patrons to use the parking lot
from 8 p.m. until 2 a.m. Decorators hired Allied to supervise the parking lot
and insure that only customers of Decorators and Royal Rack used the
parking lot. In order to insure proper use of the lot, Allied posted a sign,
which stated that Royal Rack customers could use the lot from 8 p.m. until
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

689 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1985).

Id. at 892.
Watson, 828 S.W.2d at 427.
Id.
786 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
Id. at 539.
Id.
833 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
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2 a.m., but all others, except customers of Decorators, would be towed at
their expense. Before going into Royal Rack, Mitchell read the sign posted
by Allied. After playing pool for about three hours, Mitchell returned to his
car only to find that it was no longer there. Police suggested that he call the
towing company before reporting his car stolen. Mitchell discovered that
Allied had, indeed, towed his car and went to Allied's lot to retrieve his car.
Mitchell showed Allied a receipt he had obtained from Royal Rack, but the
employee still refused to give Mitchell his car. Instead, Mitchell had to pay
$69 before his car was be returned. When Mitchell drove out of the lot, he
noticed the tires screeched and the steering wheel had too much play in it.
He then notified the police and filed an accident report. The next day,
Mitchell had his car towed to the dealership where it remained for seven
days while being repaired. During this time, Mitchell rented a car. Mitchell
later sued Allied under the DTPA for wrongfully towing his car and obtained a jury verdict in his favor. Allied argued on appeal that Mitchell
could not maintain a DTPA action because he did not seek or acquire goods
or services from Allied. The court found that Mitchell was a "consumer" as
7
he acquired the towing services of Allied, albeit involuntarily. "
The same type of conduct occurred in Coker v. Burghardt.76 Burghardt
and a friend parked in a self-serve lot near downtown Dallas. Burghardt's
friend paid the lot fee and they left the car. When they later returned to the
lot, the car was gone. A sign at the lot listed a telephone number for Tejas
Wrecker Service. Burghardt called and was told where he could retrieve his
car. At the lot, Burghardt asked to speak to someone in charge. After the
Tejas employee on duty told him this was impossible, he called the police.
The police told him this was a civil matter and that they could not do anything. As he had no cash on him, Burghardt asked to get his bank card from
his car in order to pay the fee. While getting his card, three Tejas employees
approached him in a threatening manner. Fearing for his life, he locked
himself in his car until the employees left. Burghardt then went to a nearby
convenience store and got funds from an automated teller machine to pay
the fee. When Burghardt returned to the lot to pay the fee and retrieve his
car, he found a large dent in his car's right rear quarter panel. Burghardt
called the police. They arrived, filled out a report, and once again told him
they could do nothing since the complaint involved a civil matter. Burghardt
paid the $69 fee which consisted of a $42 towing fee, a $15 storage fee and a
$10 preservation fee. A sign at the Tejas lot stated that the purpose of the
preservation fee was to protect the car from vandalism and other damage
while it was in Tejas's possession. Burghardt sued Coker, who was doing
business as Tejas Wrecker Service, under the DTPA for damaging his car.
A jury found for Burghardt and the trial court entered judgment in favor of
Burghardt. The court held that Burghart met the two part test of "consumer."' 7 7 The court held that Burghardt was a "consumer" since he paid
75. Id. at 582.
76. 833 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
77. Id. at 311.
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Tejas $69 for its services, which involved towing, storage, and preservation. 78 Furthermore, these were the very services that formed the basis of
Burghardt's complaint. According to the court, that Burghardt involuntarily acquired these services did not destroy his "consumer" status. 79
B. PRESUIT NOTICE
The DTPA provides that a consumer must give written notice of his or
her complaint at least sixty days prior to filing a suit for damages.8 0 This
notice must describe the complaint in reasonable detail and state the amount
of actual damages, expenses, and attorney's fees caused by the defendant. 8'
While the consumer has the burden to plead and prove that notice was
given in compliance with the DTPA, the supreme court has recently held
that a complaint about the lack of notice is waived if the defendant fails to
request abatement with the filing of his answer "or very soon thereafter." 8 2
Furthermore, notice is not required when limitations would run before expi83
ration of the sixty day waiting period.
In Winkle Chevy-Olds-Pontiac,Inc. v. Condon,8 4 Winkle and Condon entered a forty-eight month lease agreement on a van. After approximately
thirty months, Winkle repossessed the vehicle. A series of attempts to obtain the return of both the van and the construction tools in the van were
unavailing and Condon filed suit alleging, among other things, violations of
the DTPA. The jury found for Condon on all causes of action and awarded
him $51,556 in damages. On appeal Winkle argued that no DTPA claims
should have been submitted to the jury because Condon failed to send a
demand letter prior to filing suit. Condon, however, pleaded and proved
that limitations would have run on his claim if he had sent notice and waited
thirty days8 5 before filing suit. The court held, therefore, that he was excused from providing written notice due to impracticality pursuant to sec86
tion 17.505(b) of the DTPA.
Another situation when a consumer does not need to give notice is when
the claims are asserted as part of a counterclaim.8 7 However, in Angelo
Broadcasting,Inc. v. Satellite Music Network, Inc.,8 8 the court held that the
counterclaim exception did not apply when the consumer's suit was transferred and consolidated with a suit filed by the consumer-defendant in another county. 89 After Angelo Broadcasting's suit was transferred from
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. DTPA § 17.505(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).

81. Id.
82. Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex. 1992).
83. DTPA § 17.505(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
84. 830 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ dism'd).
85. Prior to 1989, the DTPA provided for a thirty day notice period rather than sixty
days. DTPA § 17.505(a) (Vernon 1987).

86. Condon, 830 S.W.2d at 745.
87. DTPA § 17.505 (b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).

88. 836 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
89. Id.
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Austin to Dallas, Angelo continued to rely on its Austin petition and did not
file a counterclaim until almost four years later. After the cases were consolidated, the trial court realigned the parties, designating Angelo as plaintiff
and SMN as defendant. Thus, according to the court, Angelo began and
ended the suit as plaintiff and could not rely on the counterclaim exception
to the DTPA notice requirement. 90 Angelo, relying on Star-Tel, Inc. v. Nacogdoches Telecommunications, Inc.,91 argued that SMN waived any complaint relating to lack of notice because it was not brought to the trial court's
attention until right before trial after the case had been pending for five
years. In Star-Tel, the plaintiff alleged that he gave notice of its complaint,
but did not allege that the notice had been sent thirty days prior to suit. The
defendants, during trial, filed for the first time a special exception to the
petition, alleging that the plaintiff failed to plead the requisite statutory
DTPA notice. The court held that, although the plaintiff failed to fully comply with the notice requirements, the defendant waived its right to notice
because it had all the information necessary to offer settlement three years
before the actual trial. 92 The Angelo Broadcastingcourt found Star-Tel inapplicable because Angelo never pleaded that it sent SMN notice as mandated by the DTPA.93 Therefore, Angelo did not merely fail to give
adequate notice, it gave no notice. 94 The court also concluded that a posttrial abatement to allow the giving of presuit notice is an abuse of discretion
and is not permitted. 95 According to the court, "the statutory notice requirement is designed to afford the opportunity for presuit negotiations and
settlement to avoid lengthy and costly litigation."' 96 If the party seeking recovery fails to give the requisite notice, the judgment should be reversed and
the case remanded with instructions for abating the action to afford the op97
portunity to give notice as a prerequisite to maintaining the action.
As seen in Angelo Broadcasting, lack of notice requires an abatement of
the case so that notice can be given and settlement options pursued. This
result, however, has escaped the Fifth Circuit, which continues to preclude
the recovery of additional damages when notice is not given. The court's
most recent pronouncement of this erroneous principle came in an otherwise
well-reasoned case, Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 98 In this case, recovery was allowed under the DTPA on behalf of a teenager whose death was
caused by a defective garage door opener sold to his mother by Sears and
manufactured by Chamberlain. Even though the jury found DTPA violations and additional damages against Chamberlain, the district court did not
90. Id. at 737-38.
91. 755 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).

92. Id.at 149.
93. Angelo Broadcasting, 836 S.W.2d at 738.
94. Id.

95. Id. at 739.
96. Id. at 736.
97. Id. Angelo Broadcasting was expressly disapproved by the Texas Supreme Court in
Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 467-70 (Tex. 1992), which held that lack of notice is waived if
abatement is not requested "with the filing of an answer or very soon thereafter." Id. at 469.
98. 970 F.2d 1420 (5th Cir. 1992).
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allow the recovery of these additional damages, claiming that Wellborn did
not give Chamberlain proper presuit notice. Wellborn argued that her
presuit letter to Sears was sufficient notice to Chamberlain because Sears
forwarded the claim to Chamberlain and requested that Chamberlain advise
Wellborn of its position. Sears' counsel then informed Wellborn that he was
representing both Sears and Chamberlain. The Fifth Circuit held, however,
that because the notice letter did not mention Chamberlain, Wellborn failed
to provide Chamberlain a DTPA notice letter. 99 The court then concluded
that without presuit notice a consumer cannot recover additional damages
under the DTPA.' °°
C.

FALSE, MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE ACTS

The first of four causes of action provided to consumers by the DTPA is
for false, misleading or deceptive acts enumerated in section 17.46(b) of the
Act.' 0 1 Section 17.46(b)(12) makes actionable a representation "that an
agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does
not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law."' 1 2 In Villarreal v.
Elizondo, 10 3 the court held that a seller's representation to defer the first
payment on a car loan until a certain date, but then repossessing the car
before such date, violates this provision of the DTPA.' 4 Elizondo
purchased a car from Villarreal in December 1987. The parties negotiated in
Spanish and agreed that Elizondo would pay $2,300 for the car. Elizondo
paid $500 down and signed a note written in English, that provided for biweekly payments of $65. Elizondo alleged that he and Villarreal agreed that
the first payment would not be due until January 22, 1988. On January 20,
1988, Villarreal repossessed the vehicle claiming that Elizondo had defaulted. Shortly after the purchase, but before the repossession, Elizondo
brought the car to Villarreal for repairs. When Elizondo returned to the lot
to get personal items that he had left in the car, he was bitten by a guard dog
99. Id. at 1430.
100. Id. This result, however, is simply not authorized under the DTPA § 17.505 and was
expressly rejected by the Texas Supreme Court in Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d at 464, 469 (Tex.
1992). If a defendant does raise the issue before trial and the court determines adequate notice
was not given, Texas courts simply abate the case for sixty days to give the defendant the
opportunity to settle. The Moving Co. v. Whitten, 717 S.W.2d 117, 124 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.). As seen in the Angelo Broadcastingcase, if the trial court
refuses to abate the case when no notice was given, the court of appeals may reverse and
remand for a new trial. Angelo Broadcasting, 836 S.W.2d at 739. Reversal, however, requires a
showing of harm. Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex. 1992).
When the pre-suit notice requirement was first introduced into the DTPA in 1977 (as
§ 17.50A), the failure to give notice was an affirmative defense the proof of which expressly
limited the consumer's recovery to actual damages and attorneys' fees. In other words, the
failure to give notice was a defense to treble, but not actual, damages. However, this defense
was eliminated in 1979 and replaced with current DTPA § 17.505. Since Wellborn's DTPA
claim accrued after 1979, Chamberlain could not take advantage of the 1977 version of the
DTPA notice provision and the Fifth Circuit was wrong to eliminate the additional damages
from the judgment.
101. DTPA § 17.50(a)(1) (Vernon 1987).
102. DTPA § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon 1987).

103. 831 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
104. Id. at 478.
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that Villarreal kept on the premises. Elizondo sued Villarreal for damages
arising from the dog bite, the car's repossession, usury, and failure to provide
statutory notices of purchaser's rights in the purchase contract. The jury
found for Elizondo on all issues and further found against Villarreal on his
counterclaim for breach of the purchase contract. The court of appeals
affirmed. 10 5
With respect to the DTPA claims, Villarreal argued that the jury findings
were insufficient to support liability because they were "confusing" and it
was "difficult" to tell what cause of action was being asserted and upon what
facts the jury based its findings. The court rejected this contention, noting
that Villarreal had not objected to the charge and the jury found he had
made false, deceptive, and misleading representations about the due date of
the payments, which violates DTPA section 17.46(b)(12).106 Villarreal then
argued that evidence of an oral agreement regarding the due date of the first
payment violates the parole evidence rule. The court disagreed, holding that
oral misrepresentations are actionable under the DTPA, citing Weitzel v.
07
Barnes.1
In Allied Towing Service v. Mitchell,10 8 the court held that section
17.46(b)(12) is violated when a legally parked car is towed when a sign represented that it would not be towed. 109 Allied argued to the court of appeals
that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the jury finding
that it engaged in a false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice that was a
producing cause of damages. The court found some evidence to support a
finding that Allied violated section 17.46(b)(12) in its representation in the
posted sign that it would not tow Royal Rack customers who parked in the
lot, yet doing so in Mitchell's case.1 10
In Affiliated Capital Corp. v. CommercialFederalBank,t the court held
that enforcing rights provided by contract does not violate section
17.46(b)(12).11 2 In 1983, Affiliated and ACRG Joint Venture (the Venture)
entered into a nearly $6.5 million construction loan agreement with the bank
to construct an apartment complex in Austin. The note was part of a bond
program established by the Austin Housing Financing Authority to facilitate
the building of multi-family housing. The Authority used the proceeds of a
bond sale to fund large loans to banks who would subsequently make smaller
loans, under the program guidelines, to developers of multi-family projects.
In February and March of 1986, the Venture failed to make payments on the
note. After receiving a notice of possible foreclosure, the Venture wrote the
bank offering to prepay the remaining balance of the loan. The bank re105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.at 479.
Id. at 478.
691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985).
833 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ). For a detailed discussion of the

facts of this case see the text accompanying notes 74 and 75, supra.
109. Id. at 583.
110. Id.
111. 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).

112. Id. at 528.
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sponded that the note did not allow prepayment prior to December 1992,
and that the bank would not waive the note provisions because of its bond
agreement with the Austin Housing Authority. The bank suggested that the
Venture use government securities to serve as substitute collateral. From
April through August, the Venture again failed to make payments under the
note. In August, the bank accelerated the note, demanding payment of the
balance due and the prepayment penalty. By that time, however, the Venture was no longer able to prepay the balance of the loan, so the bank foreclosed. The Venture then filed suit against the bank, alleging claims of
usury, violations of the DTPA, breach of contract, and breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
The Venture argued that the bank engaged in conduct prohibited under
section 17.46 of the DTPA, including misrepresenting the characteristics of
goods purchased by representing that they could be retained by prepayment
of the debt along with the prepayment penalty at any time (section
17.46(b)(5)); by failing to disclose that the apartment complex could be
taken away despite tendered prepayment and the penalty listed in the note
(section 17.46(b)(23)); and by misrepresenting the rights, remedies, and obligations of the loan documents (section 17.46(b)(12)).
The court of appeals rejected the Venture's contentions, noting that they
were based on the language of the note and that there was no evidence of
separate representations as to payment, acceleration, or interest.' 13 Since
the note provided that the apartment complex could be foreclosed in the
event of default despite a prior offer of prepayment, the court held that there
was no nondisclosure as alleged by the Venture and that the alleged "misrepresentations" of the bank were "merely assertions of [its] desire to stand by
' 14
the terms of the Note as construed by the Bank." "
As a defense to an action for misrepresentation under section 17.46(b),
attempts have been made to classify the representations as "puffery" or
"mere opinion" rather than statements of fact. Such an attempt was made
by the defendant, but rejected by the court, in PrudentialInsurance Co. of
America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd. 1 5 Prudential proposed to sell the Jefferson Building, a four-story commercial office building in Austin, to Jefferson Associates, a limited partnership, and F.B. Goldman. Two years after
the sale was consummated, Goldman discovered that the building contained
asbestos. Alleging that the presence of asbestos significantly depreciated the
value of the building, Goldman brought suit against Prudential, alleging violations of the DTPA, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. After the evidence was presented at trial, the parties agreed to submit liability in the case
on a general charge. The jury answered the liability question in the affirmative. The jury also found that Goldman had sustained actual damages in the
amount of $6,023,993.03, that Prudential's conduct was done with conscious
113. Id.

114. Id.
115. 839 S.W.2d 866, 872 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ requested).

19931

DTPA AND ANTITRUST

1341

indifference to Goldman's rights, and that Goldman was entitled to exemplary damages of $14,300,000.
The court of appeals affirmed, finding sufficient evidence to support liability based upon DTPA misrepresentations and fraudulent concealment. 116
In addition to representing that the building had no defects, Prudential told
Goldman that the Jefferson Building was " 'one of the finest little properties
in the City of Austin' and was a 'superb, super fine building.' 117 Prudential argued that these representations were no more than opinions or puffery
and could not form a legal basis for the judgment in favor of Goldman. The
court disagreed, relying on Pennington v. Singleton, 1 8 where the supreme
court held that representations that a boat was in "excellent" or "perfect"
condition were actionable misrepresentations under the DTPA. 119
Prudential also argued that even if it had a duty to disclose the asbestos in
the Jefferson Building, that duty was contractually eliminated under an "as
is" clause in the purchase and sale agreement. The court, relying on Weitzel
v. Barnes,120 held that contractual disclaimers cannot insulate a person from
liability under the DTPA for making misrepresentations or failing to dis121
close material facts.

The "puffery" issue was also one of the issues facing the court in Milt
Ferguson Motor Co. v. Zeretzke. 122 Zeretzke purchased a car from Ferguson
that was manufactured by General Motors. The vehicle was sold with a new
car warranty of 5 years/60,000 miles. Three months after the purchase, Zeretzke returned the vehicle to the dealership because it was losing oil pressure. Ferguson claimed to have repaired the car, but less than thirty days
later water was leaking on the floorboard. That problem was not properly
repaired because another three weeks later, four inches of water covered the
floorboard. In May 1988, after complaints about engine noise, Ferguson
made major engine repairs and told Zeretzke that the work had been done
and the car was in good shape. However, the engine noise continued. But
when Mrs. Zeretzke took the car in for repairs, she was told by the service
manager that he could not hear the noise. Thus, no further repairs were
made. The oil leak problems continued through 1989 as did the noise in the
engine. In February 1989, Zeretzke took the vehicle to another repairman
who told Zeretzke that there were cracks in the engine block. Soon thereafter, the car was inspected by Ferguson and the cam gear noise was verified.
On October 19, 1989, Zeretzke filed suit against Ferguson and General Motors alleging, among other things, misrepresentations and breach of the implied warranty of good and workmanlike services, both of which are
actionable under the DTPA. This case was tried to the court, which determined that both Ferguson and General Motors engaged in conduct violating
116. Id. at 872-73.
117. Id.at 871.
118. 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
119. Jefferson, 839 S.W.2d at 872; see Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 687.

120. 691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985).
121. Jefferson, 839 S.W.2d at 873.
122. 827 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
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the DTPA and awarded Zeretzke damages for repairs, loss of use, and
mental anguish. The court of appeals affirmed. 1 23
Ferguson argued that the representations made concerning the sale and
repairs to the car were not actionable under the DTPA because they were
"mere puffing." The representations included those found in "pamphlets at
the dealership, magazine articles, newspaper articles, and advertisements
concerning the quality of the car as a 'good, excellent motor vehicle.' ",124
Additionally, Ferguson repeatedly told Zeretzke " 'how good the car was,
and the quality of it' and that 'it was a better car than the Calais that they
had,' [and] that it 'was a good car and that they would have no
problems.' "125 Ferguson also assured Zeretzke that the problems of which
they complained had been properly repaired when, in fact, the problems continued to exist. The court concluded that these were substantial misrepresentations of material facts and not just puffery.1 26
D.

BREACH OF WARRANTY

The second cause of action that a consumer can bring under the DTPA is
for breach of an express or implied warranty.1 27 The DTPA does not define
"warranty" or specify when a "breach" occurs. 128 Rather than creating ad-

ditional warranties, the DTPA makes actionable warranties that exist at

29
common law or by statute. 1

One such common law warranty is the implied warranty that services will
be performed in a good and workmanlike manner. Ever since this warranty
was recognized in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes,'30 there has
been uncertainty as to whether the warranty applies to those who provide socalled "professional" services.'

31

In Chapman v. PaulR. Wilson, Jr., D.D.S.,

Inc.132 the court held that a dentist does not impliedly warrant that his or
her services will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner. 133 According to the court, the supreme court has not overruled Dennis v. Allison, 134 where the court refused to impose on a psychologist who sexually
abused his patient an implied warranty that he would not violate his professional code of ethics.135 As an additional ground for denying recovery the
123. Id. at 352.
124. Id. at 355.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. DTPA § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 1987).
128. McDade v. Texas Commerce Bank, 822 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
129. Id. at 718.
130. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
131. See Mark L. Kincaid, Recognizing an Implied Warranty that "Professional"Services
Will be Performed in a Good and Workmanlike Manner, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 685 (1990) (discussing difficulty in defining "professional" and stating reasons for applying implied warranty
to all service providers).
132. 826 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
133. Id. at 217-18.
134. 698 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1985).
135. Chapman, 826 S.W.2d at 217; see Dennis, 698 S.W.2d at 96.
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court noted that to show breach of warranty by a dentist would require expert testimony that the trial court had stricken as a discovery sanction, thus
making it impossible for Chapman to prove his case.' 36
A different outcome was reached in Luker v. Arnold.' 37 Arnold brought
this case against Luker, who was a developer of a subdivision in which Arnold bought a duplex from Billingsley, the builder. As the developer, Luker
platted the subdivision and the lot sizes and was the author of certain deed
restrictions. Luker also had the responsibility to make sure that the builder
constructed residences in conformance with the deed restrictions. Arnold
experienced damages caused by the failure of the septic system, which was
caused in part by the size of the lot. After Arnold discovered the lot size was
below the minimum standards, he sued Luker under the DTPA for misrepresentations and breach of an implied warranty to develop the property in a
good and workmanlike manner. The jury found in favor of Arnold and
Luker appealed.
Luker argued that Arnold could not recover for breach of implied warranty because Texas law does not recognize an implied warranty that a person developing property do so in a good and workmanlike manner. The
court recognized that there was no Texas case extending such an implied
warranty to developers, but found that such a warranty is consistent with
the policies announced in Humber v. Morton, 38 and Melody Home. 139 In
Humber the court held that a builder/vendor impliedly warrants that a
building constructed for residential use is constructed in a good and workmanlike manner and is suitable for human habitation. 14 The reason for
such a warranty is because "the consumer relies on the skill of the builder
and on [his] implied representation that the house will be erected in a reasonably workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for habitation."' 4'
In Melody Home, the court extended these implied warranties to service
142
transactions, finding a need to protect consumers from inferior services.
The court also extended the warranty because consumers should be able to
rely on the expertise of the service provider, and the service provider is more
able to absorb the cost of damages associated with inferior services than the
individual consumer. 43 The Luker court held that the public interest in
protecting consumers from inferior work was as applicable in the instant
case as it was in Melody Home.' 4 Here the Arnolds were complaining of
damages caused by septic problems resulting from small lot size and faulty
installation. These problems, noted the court, had significant health and financial consequences because the lot may not contain sufficient room to con136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.at 218.
843 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 1992, no writ).
426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
Humber, 426 S.W.2d at 554.
Luker, 843 S.W.2d at 115 (citing Humber, 426 S.W.2d at 560).
Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 353-54.
Id.
Luker, 843 S.W.2d at 116.
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struct a new absorption field in a new location.' 45 The court also determined
that developers are in a better position to prevent this type of loss than the
consumers. 146 Developers plat subdivisions and lot sizes and are frequently
the authors of deed restrictions, as was Luker. In this case, the deed restrictions gave Luker the power to approve or disapprove of the improvements
on the lots. Luker exercised its power by sending a letter of approval to the
builders. Thus, Luker was the only party in a position to plat the subdivision and the only party whose approval was required to assure that the
builders met their restrictions. The court also determined that most consumers do not have responsibility or experience in determining lot size or 1in
47
determining why and how certain deed restrictions should be followed.
Instead, the consumers must rely on the developer's expertise in this area.
The court also held that a developer is more able to absorb the cost of dam48
ages associated with inferior development than the individual consumer.'
For all of these reasons, the court held that a developer impliedly warrants
to develop property in a good and workmanlike manner. 149
Consistent with the supreme court's decision in Melody Home, the First
Court of Appeals in Bowe v. GeneralMotors Corp.150 held that the implied
warranty that repair services will be done in good and workmanlike manner
cannot be disclaimed or waived. 15 Bowe brought suit under the DTPA,
alleging that Wiesner and GM had breached the implied warranty to repair
the car in a good and workmanlike manner and that GM failed to build the
car in a good and workmanlike manner. GM and Wiesner asserted that the
Bowes' suit was barred by a disclaimer of warranties in the sales contract.
The court held, however, that this disclaimer could not waive an implied
warranty that the repair services would be done in a good and workmanlike
manner.' 5 2 Furthermore, the disclaimer did not mention GM or any product or service provided by GM. As such, the disclaimer could not affect any
53
claims against GM.'
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nichols,'5 4 the court held that the implied
warranty of good and workmanlike services is not breached when 55a
mechanic does not make repairs that a consumer refused to authorize.
Mrs. Nichols took her riding lawnmower to Sears for repairs. Sears told her
the motor needed new motor mounts. Sears called Mr. Nichols to tell him
that with the new motor mounts they would also need to replace the drive
belt, because the existing one he had installed was now too short. Although
the mechanic explained to Mr. Nichols that the transmission would not dis145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id. at 116.
Id.
830 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
Id. at 779.
Id.
Id.
819 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
Id. at 904-05.
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engage properly without a new belt, Mr. Nichols said for Sears to "[1]eave
that damn belt alone." 15 6 After again telling Mr. Nichols the mower was
not going to work properly, Sears acquiesced and did not replace the belt.
Mrs. Nichols picked up the lawnmower and then suffered knee injuries when
her son drove the mower into her because he was unable to disengage the
transmission. Mr. and Mrs. Nichols then sued Sears. In a bench trial, the
court found Sears breached an implied warranty to perform its services in a
good and workmanlike manner and was negligent. In addition, the trial
court found Sears acted knowingly and awarded additional damages under
the DTPA.
The court of appeals held that the conduct of Sears in this case did not
breach an implied warranty to perform the repairs in a good and workmanlike manner. 157 There was no dispute that Sears properly performed its services in replacing the motor mounts. The only work complained of was the
work Mr. Nichols told Sears not to do. There was evidence that Mr. Nichols had considerable experience with lawnmowers and was repeatedly told of
the risk that the transmission would not work properly if the belt was not
replaced. The court stated, "[w]e decline to extend the Melody Home warranty to a case where the service provider attempted to obtain authorization
for necessary repairs, explained the consequences of failing to make those
repairs, and, only at the knowledgeable customer's insistence, refrained from
doing so."158 The court of appeals also held that the trial court erred in
finding Sears negligent. 159 The court found no discernible difference between a claim for failure to perform in a good and workmanlike manner and
a claim for negligent performance. 160 The court found it would be incongruous to hold that Sears had performed in a good and workmanlike manner
1 61
but was nevertheless negligent.
This same implied warranty was found to apply to a business that was
hired to perform a sand fracing operation on an oil well. In Geo Viking, Inc.
v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., 16 2 Geo Viking was hired to frac, an operation
intended to open fissures in the ground formation so as to allow more oil and
gas to reach the well. The agreement between the parties specified that two
trucks would be on site and available for the job, one primary and one
backup. This was necessary because if the equipment broke down during
critical parts of the process, the whole process would fail. Geo Viking
showed up with two trucks. After a short time, the first truck failed, but not
at a critical point. Instead of using the backup truck, Geo Viking sent for a
third truck. That truck also failed, this time at a critical point. Tex-Lee
then learned that the backup truck did not work and that Geo Viking had
156. Id. at 902.
157. Id. at 904-05.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 907.
160. Id.; see also Chapman, 826 S.W.2d at 218 (finding negligence standard and "good and
workmanlike manner" standard to be similar).
161. Sears, 819 S.W.2d at 907.
162. 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991), writ denied per curiam, 839 S.W.2d
797 (Tex. 1992).
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knowingly brought an inoperable truck to the site. The jury found that Geo
Viking failed to perform the fracing job in a workmanlike manner. The jury
also determined that Geo Viking provided a backup truck that was not fit for
its ordinary purposes. The court of appeals extended the Melody Home
warranty to Geo Viking since it was supposed to provide services to TexLee. 163 The court then found sufficient evidence to show that Geo Viking
breached the warranties as found by the jury. 164 The standard in the business required two trucks for this type of job, because of the danger of causing
the precise situation that eventually occurred. At no time did Geo Viking
have two working trucks at the site. Furthermore, Geo Viking knew the
reason that two trucks were specified was so that there would be a backup,
yet Geo Viking knowingly brought to the site only one working truck.
Another case where the existence and the breach of the implied warranty
of good and workmanlike performance of services was acknowledged was
Cronin v. Bacon. 165 In that case, Bacon entered into a "stallion service contract" with Cronin for the breeding of Bacon's mare with a champion stallion. Bacon later discovered that his mare was not bred with the stallion.
The jury found that Cronin breached her implied warranty to perform the
stud services in a good and workmanlike manner. The court of appeals,
relying upon Archibald v. Act III Arabians,166 held that such a warranty
existed under these facts and that the evidence supported the jury's
finding. 167
In Slentz v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 the court was asked to extend the
Melody Home implied warranty to providers of air transportation services.
Mr. Slentz, a ninety-two year old man, alleged that while changing planes at
DFW airport he was hit by an electric passenger cart owned by American
Airlines. As a result, he suffered injuries that required a partial hip replacement. Mr. Slentz alleged that by agreeing to transport him, American Airlines impliedly warranted to provide safe carriage. The court refused to
recognize such an implied warranty since no Texas court has ever discussed
or recognized it.169 Furthermore, the court held, a common carrier is not an
insurer of the safety of its passengers but owes them that high degree of care
that a very cautious, prudent, and competent person would use under the
same or similar circumstances. 170 The court also noted that even though
special exceptions had been granted and the allegations of breach of warranty stricken, the trial court asked the jury questions relating to American's
alleged breach of this warranty. The jury failed to find that American
breached an implied warranty of safe carriage. That being so, the court
stated that it did not need to decide whether Texas recognizes this implied
163. Id. at 363.
164. Id. at 362-63.
165. 837 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988).
Cronin, 837 S.W.2d at 268.
817 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
Id. at 369.
Id.
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warranty. 171
In Darr Equipment Co. v. Allen, 172 the court concluded that there is no
common law action for breach of the implied warranty to perform services
in a good and workmanlike manner and that this warranty is actionable only
under the DTPA. 73 Thus, rather than applying the four year statute of
limitations to Allen's breach of warranty action, the court used the DTPA's
two year limitations period. To reach this conclusion the court placed together two unrelated sentences from the supreme court's opinion in Melody
Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes174 as follows:
[T]he court, stating that consumers of repair services "do not have the
protection of a statutory or common law implied warranty scheme,"
held "that an implied warranty to repair or modify existing tangible
manner is available to
goods or property in a good and workmanlike
175
consumers suing under the DTPA."'
The first quoted portion, however, merely recognizes that at the time Melody
Home was decided the law did not provide for such an implied warranty.
The supreme court then followed this statement with an analysis of why the
implied warranty was needed. The supreme court never determined that
this implied warranty was actionable only under the DTPA. In fact, the
court noted that the DTPA does not create warranties, it merely provides a
cause of action for breach of an existing warranty.' 76 Therefore, a consumer
has the option of bringing an action for breach of the implied warranty
under the common law or under the DTPA. The advantage to suing under
the DTPA is that consumers may recover attorneys' fees 177 and treble damages.178 This action, of course, would be governed by the DTPA's two year
statute of limitations. 179 Common law warranty actions, however, are subject to the four year statute of limitations.180
Express warranties are also actionable under the DTPA.181 For example,
in McDade v. Texas Commerce Bank,'8 2 McDade deposited the funds into a
money market account at Texas Commerce Bank (TCB). McDade intended
for the money to go into a nontaxable retirement account and was assured
by the bank's employee that this had been done. However, McDade later
learned that the money was put in a regular, taxable account. The court of
appeals held the employee's statement amounted to an express warranty,
which "is created when a seller makes an affirmation of fact or a promise to
the purchaser, which relates to the sale and warrants a conformity to the
171. Id.
172. 824 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied).

173. Id. at 712.
174. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
175. Darr Equipment, 824 S.W.2d at 712 (citations omitted) (quoting Melody Home, 741

S.W.2d at 353-54).
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 355.
DTPA § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987).
DTPA § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
DTPA § 17.565 (Vernon 1987).
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).

DTPA § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 1987).
822 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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affirmation as promised." 183 McDade testified that he and the bank's employee talked only about IRAs and that the employee told him about a new
money market IRA. McDade, in response, told the employee that he wished
to open the money market IRA she had described. While McDade did not
recall the employee stating that the account he opened was indeed a money
market IRA, the court of appeals concluded that the employee's conduct
affirmed the fact that she was opening an IRA for McDade. The employee
did not say she was not opening an IRA. According to the court, the employee "received McDade's funds and deposited them after he gave her specific instructions to open an IRA. This conduct constitutes an affirmation of
the fact that [the employee] was opening an IRA."'1 84
In Roy v. Howard-GlendaleFuneralHome, 18 5 the court held that a breach
of an express warranty is not the same as a breach of contract. 8 6 Roy
bought a funeral casket and vault for her mother from Howard-Glendale
Funeral Home. When Roy later had her mother's remains disinterred and
relocated, she discovered the vault was filled with water. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to submit a breach of contract question
to the jury because it had submitted a question on breach of express warranty. 18 7 Roy argued that breach of contract and breach of express warranty are separate theories and that she had offered evidence supporting
submission of both. The court of appeals disagreed. Relying on Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FDP Corp.188 the court concluded that Roy had
only a breach of warranty cause of action, not a breach of contract claim. 189
Breach of contract and breach of warranty are not the same cause of
action. The remedies for breach of contract are available to a buyer
where the seller fails to make any delivery; the remedies for breach of
warranty are available to a buyer who has received and accepted goods,
but discovers they are defective in some manner.' 90
The court concluded that since Howard-Glendale delivered a vault to Roy,
which was used for many years, Roy's claim that the vault was defective
because it was not the vault she ordered or that it was defective because it
did not perform in the manner warranted were both breach of warranty
claims. 191
In Johnson Roofing, Inc. v. Staas Plumbing Co., 192 Johnson Roofing replaced the roof of a building owned by Staas and occupied by Waco Packing.
Five months later, the roof partially collapsed after a heavy rain. Staas sued
Johnson Roofing and Waco Packing intervened. Staas and Waco Packing
183. Id. at 718 (quoting McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp., 685 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
184. McDade, 822 S.W.2d at 719.
185. 820 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
186. Id. at 848.

187. Id.
188.
189.
190.
191.

811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991).
Roy, 820 S.W.2d at 848.
Id.
Id.

192. 823 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ).
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alleged that Johnson Roofing violated the DTPA by breaching an express
warranty as well as implied warranties that the ballasted roof would be suitable for the building and that the new roof would be installed in a good and
workmanlike manner. The jury found that Johnson Roofing and Staas were
both negligent, but failed to find a breach of warranty. Notwithstanding the
verdict, the court disregarded the answers to the warranty and damage questions and entered a judgment in favor of Staas and Waco Packing for attorney's fees and an amount of actual damages greater than those found by the
jury. The court of appeals reversed the judgment n.o.v. and remanded the
cause with instructions for the trial court to render a judgment against Johnson Roofing in favor of Staas and Waco Packing based on the verdict.' 9 3
Johnson Roofing expressly warranted that it would repair any defects in the
original replacement roof that resulted solely from faults or defects in workmanship. The court found that there was some evidence to support the
jury's refusal to find that Johnson Roofing breached this warranty since
there were witnesses that attributed the failure to causes other than defects
in workmanship in the new root's installation or the weight of the new roof
exceeding the roof-structure's design limitations. 194 There was also evidence
from Johnson Roofing that the new roof was installed without any defects in
workmanship and that the collapse resulted solely from causes that it could
not have been reasonably aware of and over which it had no control. The
court found that there was some evidence to support the jury's failure to find
a breach of implied warranty to install the roof in a good and workmanlike
manner.195
In GT & MC, Inc. v. Texas City Refining, Inc., 196 the court was asked to
determine the types of damages that could be recovered for a breach of an
express warranty. Texas City Refining, Inc. (TCR) purchased an oil tank
from GT & MC. The tank featured a patented roof, designed to float on the
surface of the oil in the tank. GT & MC expressly warranted the tank and
roof to withstand 125 mile per hour winds and 10 inches of rainfall, even
when the roof drains were blocked. Hurricane Alicia hit the Texas coast.
The wind velocity and amount of rainfall did not exceed the limits that GT
& MC warranted. Still, the roof sank, resulting in a loss of 38,754 barrels of
oil. TCR sued for breach of warranty and obtained a judgment in the
amount of $380,000 for loss of the use of the tank and $570,000 for the value
of the lost oil. GT & MC argued that TCR was not entitled to damages for
lost use and lost product since the contract limited breach of warranty damages exclusively to repair or replacement. According to the court of appeals,
once TCR established the warranty and its breach (neither of which were
contested by GT & MC), TCR was entitled to pursue any and all remedies
for damages, unless the warranty was disclaimed or liability for breach was
limited.197 The contract did limit TCR's recovery for defects in material or
193. Id. at 783.
194. Id. at 787.
195. Id.
196.

822 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).

197. Id. at 257. While such disclaimers and limitations of liability for breach of warranty
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workmanship to damages for repair or replacement. However, there was no
to
similar limitation on damages for design defects. Thus, the court refused
1 98
imply one and held that consequential damages were recoverable.
E.

UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT

The third cause of action the DTPA provides consumers is for "any unconscionable action or course of action. .". 199 "Unconscionable action or
course of action" is defined as "an act or practice which, to a person's detriment ... takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or
capacity of a person to a grossly unfair degree; or . . . results in a gross

disparity between the value received and consideration paid, in a transaction
involving transfer of consideration." '200
In Fort Worth Mortgage Corp. v. Abercrombie,20 1 Abercrombie paid Fort

Worth Mortgage a monthly premium for a mortgage protection policy issued by Life Investors. The policy provided that, in the event of disability,
Abercrombie's house payments would be paid for up to 300 months. However, when Abercrombie became permanently disabled the insurance covered his monthly house payment for only one year. When Abercrombie
received a letter informing him that the twelfth payment was the final one,
he discovered that Fort Worth Mortgage had canceled the policy about eight
years prior, substituting a policy with less benefits issued by Mortgage Bankers Life Insurance Company. It just so happened that the president of Fort
Worth Mortgage was chairman of the board of Mortgage Bankers. Abercrombie then filed suit against Fort Worth Mortgage alleging violations of
article 21.21 of the Insurance Code and the DTPA. Finding that the mortgage company's conduct was unconscionable, committed knowingly, and
false, misleading, and/or deceptive, the jury awarded actual damages of
$70,275, additional damages of $100,000, and attorney's fees amounting to
20 2
one-third of the total award. The court of appeals affirmed.
Fort Worth Mortgage argued that it was not unconscionable for it to
switch policies and not inform Abercrombie of the switch because there was
not a gross disparity between the consideration paid and the benefits received. The court held that while there was not a shockingly high price
being paid for something of little value, there was a gross disparity between
what Abercrombie was led to believe he would receive and the benefits he
actually received. 20 3 The court also held that there was evidence that Fort
Worth Mortgage took advantage of Abercrombie's lack of knowledge by not
properly informing him of the policy switch and that a year's coverage proare effective in a breach of warranty action brought under the DTPA (and do not offend the
'no waiver" provision of § 17.42), they cannot limit liability for the acts listed in § 17.46(b).
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1991).

198. Texas City Refining, 822 S.W.2d at 257.
199. DTPA § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon 1987).
200. DTPA § 17.45(5) (Vernon 1987).
201. 835 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
202. Id. at 262.

203. Id. at 266.
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vided little value for Abercrombie, who was permanently disabled. 204
In Allied Towing Service v. Mitchell,205 Mitchell brought suit against Allied Towing after his car was wrongfully towed from a parking lot while he
was playing pool. The jury found, among other things, that Allied had engaged in unconscionable conduct by towing the car. On appeal, Allied argued that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support this
finding. The court held that there was evidence that Allied took advantage
of Mitchell's lack of knowledge so as to support the unconscionable conduct
finding. 20 6 This evidence included the fact that Mitchell parked his car legally, which led him to believe that his car would not be towed. Thus,
"Mitchell did not know that Allied would tow his car when he parked and
'20 7
walked into [the pool hall]."
In Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Commercial FederalBank,208 Affiliated executed a note payable to the bank in order to borrow money to construct an
apartment complex. Affiliated defaulted and, upon receiving a notice of
foreclosure, offered to pay the note in full. The bank said prepayment was
not allowed because the note was part of a bond program established by the
Austin Housing Financing Authority. Several months later the bank accelerated the note. But by this time, Affiliated no longer had the funds to pay
the note and the property was foreclosed by the bank. Affiliated claimed
that the bank acted unconscionably by taking "irrational and oppressive actions" to prevent payment of the note, depriving Affiliated of the value of its
investment in the property. Affiliated alleged that this conduct created a
gross disparity in value as prohibited by DTPA section 17.50(a)(3). The
court held that gross disparity in this transaction would require evidence
that Affiliated was prevented from using the $6.5 million borrowed even
though it was paying interest on such money, or that Affiliated had sustained
a similar inequity in its bargain. 20 9 According to the court, the evidence
showed otherwise. Affiliated received the use of the money to build the
apartment complex and the bank did not assure Affiliated that it would
make money on its investment. The court, therefore, held that Affiliated's
failure to benefit from its investment could not form the basis of any DTPA
2 10
claim against the bank.
F.

VIOLATIONS OF THE INSURANCE CODE

The last cause of action provided by the DTPA is for violations of article
21.21 of the Insurance Code and any rules or regulations promulgated thereunder. 21 1 Section 16 of article 21.21 also provides a private cause of action
for violations of article 21.21 and the rules and regulations promulgated
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
833 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
Id. at 584.
Id.

208. 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).

209. Id. at 529.
210. Id.
211.

DTPA § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon 1987).
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thereunder, as well as violations of section 17.46 of the DTPA. 2 12 Though
discussion of these cases would be appropriate here, they are treated in the
2 13
"Insurance" section.
G.

1.

DAMAGES

Actual damages

a.

Measures of damages for economic loss; no measure exclusive.

The prevailing consumer is entitled to recover his or her "actual damages."' 214 "Actual damages" has been defined as "the total loss sustained [by
the consumer] as a result of the deceptive trade practice.

' 21 5

At common

law, two measures of damages for economic loss from misrepresentation are
the "benefit-of-the-bargain" and "out-of-pocket" measures, 2 16 both of which
attempt to measure diminution in the market value of the subject of the
transaction. Over the years, numerous courts have held that a consumer
cannot recover both of these types of damages, but only the one that pro-

vides the greater recovery. 21 7 During the Survey period the supreme court
made clear in Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum 2 18 that the "benefit-of-the-bar-

gain" and "out-of-pocket" measures are not the exclusive measures of economic loss under the DTPA and that the consumer may recover under
whatever measure or element that will make him whole. In this case,
212. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Even though there
should be no doubt that section 16 provides a private cause of action, see Vail v. Texas Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988), the Texarkana court of appeals seems to
have some doubt about this. In CNA Ins. Co. v. Scheffey, 828 S.W.2d 785, 791 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1992, writ denied), the court made the curious statement that "Whether there is
any private cause of action under Article 21.21 apart from by incorporation in a Deceptive
Trade Practices Act action may well be an open question." The court then referred the reader
to Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 593 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1980). In that case, the court,
in a per curiam opinion, denied Hi-Line's application for writ of error, finding no reversible
error by the court of appeals, but disapproving of the lower court's holdings that a private
cause of action under article 21.21 must be based upon the DTPA and that only consumers
can bring suit under article 21.21. Thus, there is no doubt that the DTPA and article 21.21
each provide a separate cause of action, each with its own requirements and remedies, even if
each incorporates the other.
213. Michael W. Huddleston & R. Brent Cooper, InsuranceLaw, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 46 SMU L. Rev. 1541, 1541-45 (1993).
214. DTPA § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
215. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992) (quoting Kish v. Van
Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1985)); A.V.I., Inc. v. Heathington, 842 S.W.2d 712 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied).
216. "Benefit-of-the-bargain" means the difference between the value of what is received
and its value as represented, while "out-of-pocket" means the difference in value between what
is given and what is received. Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 78 n.1 (Tex.
1977); see also LSR Joint Venture No. 2 v. Callewart, 837 S.W.2d 693, 701-02 (Tex. App.Dallas 1992, writ denied).
217. W.O. Bankston Nissan, Inc. v. Walters, 754 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. 1988); Sumrall v.
Navistar Fin. Corp., 818 S.W.2d 548, 558 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied); Odom v.
Meraz, 810 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991), writ denied per curiam, 835 S.W.2d
626 (Tex. 1992).
218. 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992). Before Bynum, Justice Mauzy stated the same in a
concurring opinion in W.O. Bankston Nissan, Inc. v. Walters, 754 S.W.2d 127, 128-29 (Tex.
1988).
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Bynum recovered the lost money he had invested in a hair-styling salon because Henry S. Miller had misrepresented the leased space. Chief Justice
Phillips wrote a concurring opinion in Bynum to draw a distinction between
"direct" and "consequential" actual damages. According to Chief Justice
Phillips consequential damages are "special damages" and, while direct or
general damages are recoverable under a general prayer, special damages
must be specifically pleaded. 219 Examples of such damages given by Chief
Justice Phillips were lost profits, loss of credit, loss for improvements made,
2 20
interest on indebtedness, and related and reasonably necessary expenses.
In Odom v. Meraz,22 1 Meraz sued Odom under the DTPA for Odom's
failure to disclose that one wall of the house Meraz bought from Odom encroached on adjoining property. Meraz had purchased the house to remodel
and resell. But because of the encroachment, he was not able to sell the
house after making the repairs. The damage question was submitted broadly
to the jury as: "What sum of money, if paid now in cash, do you find from a
preponderance of the evidence, would fairly and reasonably compensate
[Meraz] for [his] actual damages, if any?" 222 No limiting instruction as to
damages was given and no consequential damage question was submitted.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment in favor of Meraz, finding no
223
evidence of "out-of-pocket" or "benefit-of-the-bargain" damages.
The supreme court denied Meraz's application for writ of error, stating
that "we neither approve nor disapprove of the court of appeal's treatment
of damages under the [DTPA]." 224 The per curiam is a little puzzling. In
light of its holding in Bynum expressly rejecting the exclusivity of the "benefit-of-the-bargain" and "out-of-pocket" measures, it is difficult to see how
the supreme court could ever "approve" of the court of appeals' treatment of
damages in Meraz. The denial of the writ of error may have been based on
the trial court's failure to instruct on damages, which has long been held
225
error.
b.

Mental anguish

Among the many types of actual damages recoverable under the DTPA
are those for mental anguish. 226 Mental anguish damages are intangible in
nature and the translation of such into a dollar amount is best left to the trier
of fact. 227 Accordingly, much discretion must be given to the jury in fulfil219. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d at 163-64 (Phillips, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 164.
221. 810 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1991), writ deniedper curiam, 835 S.W.2d 626
(Tex. 1992).
222. Id. at 244 (emphasis omitted).
223. Id. at 245.
224. Meraz v. Odom, 835 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. 1992).
225. See Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1973).
226. See Centroplex Ford, Inc. v. Kirby, 736 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1987, no
writ); Kold-Serve Corp. v. Ward, 736 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ
dism'd by agr.).
227. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gros, 818 S.W.2d 908, 915 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991,
no writ); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590, 601 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1991, writ denied).
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ling its duty to fix the amount of mental anguish damages and the court
22 8
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury.
Historically, Texas allowed recovery for mental anguish damages only
when a physical injury accompanied the mental anguish or when there was a
physical manifestation of the mental anguish. 229 Exceptions to this general
rule were recognized when the case involved intentional torts, gross negligence, or a willful and wanton disregard for another's rights. 230 In Luna v.
North Star Dodge Sales, Inc.,2 31 the supreme court recognized that a finding
of "knowingly" under the DTPA was an exception to the physical manifestation requirement because this mental state was akin to the mental states in
2 32
intentional conduct, willful and wanton disregard, and gross negligence.
The supreme court finally abolished the physical injury rule in St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard.233 The collapse of the general rule would seem to
make the exceptions, including the "knowingly" exception recognized in
Luna, of no force and effect. This was the holding in Milt Ferguson Motor
Co. v. Zeretzke. 234 Ferguson attempted to avoid a judgment for mental
anguish damages, arguing that such damages are recoverable only when the
consumer obtains a finding that the DTPA violation was committed knowingly. The court rejected this argument because the physical injury rule was
abolished in Garrard. 235 Thus, the court concluded that it is no longer necessary to plead and prove a knowing violation of the DTPA before mental
236
anguish can be recovered.
In Dan Boone Mitsubishi, Inc. v. Ebrom,237 the court upheld a judgment
for mental anguish damages resulting from a car dealer's failure to provide
title to a car, holding that such damages are recoverable without a finding of
some other actual damages. 238 In May of 1987, Jane Ebrom went to Mitsubishi to purchase a used car. Because she wanted to put the car in her
son's name, Daniel Ebrom executed the purchase agreement on the car. The
purchase agreement showed Dan Boone Mitsubishi as the seller of the car.
Ebrom traded in her old car, which was shortly thereafter sold to a used car
wholesaler. In August 1987, when the license sticker became due on the car,
Ebrom went to Dan Boone Mitsubishi and told them that she had not received title to car. Ebrom was then given a license sticker good until August
1988. She was informed that there had been a paperwork mix-up and the
title to the car would be received in a few weeks. In August 1988, Ebrom
228. Gros, 818 S.W.2d at 915; Sumrall v. Navistar Fin. Corp., 818 S.W.2d 548, 559 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied); Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d at 601.
229. See St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. 1987).

230. Id.
231. 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1984).
232. Id. at 117.

233. 730 S.W.2d at 654.
234. 827 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).

235. Zeretzke, 827 S.W.2d at 357.
236.
Austin
Austin
237.

Id.; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gros, 818 S.W.2d 908, 915 (Tex. App.1991, no writ); HOW Ins. Co. v. Patriot Fin. Servs., 786 S.W.2d 533, 543 (Tex. App.1990, writ denied).
830 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).

238. Id. at 337.
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still had not received title to the car and discovered that title was held by
Robert Orr, an employee of Dan Boone Mitsubishi. She then went back to
Dan Boone and talked to the general manager who assured her that the
problem would be resolved immediately. The general manager gave Ebrom
a paper license tag that was good for ten days. Ebrom used the paper tags
for about two or three weeks and then had to obtain a license sticker for her
car illegally. After repeated attempts, and several promises from Dan Boone
employees, Ebrom was unable to obtain title to the vehicle purchased from
Dan Boone Mitsubishi. Ebrom then brought suit against Dan Boone Mitsubishi seeking damages under the DTPA for its failure to deliver a certificate of title. The trial court granted judgment for Ebrom for $90,000 in
damages plus attorney's fees of $7,500.
On appeal Dan Boone Mitsubishi complained of the award of damages for
mental anguish. Reviewing the evidence, the court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support the finding of mental anguish by the trial court. 23 9
Ebrom purchased the car from Dan Boone, traded in her old car, and paid
the purchase price, all in good faith. She was told at the time of the
purchase, and then several times after the problem with her license sticker
arose, that she would receive title to the purchased vehicle. However, she
never received title to the car. Her old car was wholesaled shortly after the
purchase, and there was no way for her to get it back after the title problems
with her new purchase became apparent. Ebrom was then forced to illegally
obtain a license sticker for the car so that she would have a means of transportation. She testified that she was terrified the entire time that she was
driving the vehicle because of its illegal status. She also testified that she was
very cautious and very worried because she transported customers in her
car. On one occasion she was stopped by the police and was very frightened
that the police could assume the car was stolen. The court held that this was
sufficient evidence of emotional pain, torment, and suffering to constitute
mental anguish. 24° Dan Boone Mitsubishi also argued that it was improper
to award mental anguish damages without a finding of some other actual
damages. Based upon St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard24 1 where the only
damages recovered were for mental anguish, the court held that damages for
mental anguish can be recovered without a finding of other types of actual
242
damages.
In Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Thomas,243 Commonwealth
refused to pay a claim made by the Thomases after their house burned down.
Relying on an investigation by Loss Research & Analysis, Commonwealth
concluded that arson caused the fire. The Thomases successfully sued Commonwealth for breach of contract, and this judgment was affirmed on appeal. Later, they sued Commonwealth for breach of the duty of good faith
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
1993).

Id. at 337.
Id. at 336-37.
730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
Ebrom, 830 S.W.2d at 337.
825 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), vacated by agr., 843 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.

1356

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

and fair dealing after the supreme court recognized that cause of action in
Arnold v. National County Mutual FireInsurance Co.244 The trial court rendered judgment for $708,800 in actual damages, $2,000,001 in exemplary
damages and $1,000,637.60 for prejudgment interest. Of the amount found
as actual damages, $200,000 was for Mr. Thomas's mental anguish and
$300,000 was for Mrs. Thomas's mental anguish. Commonwealth argued
that the evidence regarding mental anguish did not go beyond disappointment, anger, 24 5 resentment or embarrassment and thus no mental anguish
damages could be recovered. The court held that "[b]ecause there are no
objective guidelines by which the money equivalent of mental pain may be
measured, the jury must be allowed considerable discretion in fixing the
amount. '246 The court further stated that mental anguish can be inferred
from the unrepaired condition of the insureds' home and their shortage of
clothes and furniture. 247 With these principles in mind, the court found the
evidence sufficient to support the jury's award of damages for mental
anguish. 248 Such evidence included testimony that Commonwealth's accusations of arson caused Mr. and Mrs. Thomas, he a builder and she a real
estate broker, to lose credibility with their associates. Suppliers wanted to
see whether the insurance company was going to pay the claim before extending credit to them. The Thomases also suffered embarrassment in front
of their friends and their living conditions deteriorated as they moved from a
hotel apartment to a rented house to a travel trailer because of their inability
to meet the rental expense.
c.

Other types of actual damages

As mentioned above, a consumer who prevails under the DTPA can recover the total loss sustained as a result of the deceptive trade practice.
Thus, there are a host of potential actual damages recoverable including loss
of investment capital, loss of credit, 249 loss for improvements made, interest
on indebtedness, lost profits, and damages for removal of a defective
250
product.
(1) Lost profits
Lost profits are recoverable under the DTPA when there is evidence that
244. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
245. See Cronin v. Bacon, 837 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ de-

nied) (court of appeals reversed the mental anguish damages because the only testimony was
that the plaintiff was angry because of the defendant's conduct).
246. Thomas, 825 S.W.2d at 145.
247. Id.

248. Id. at 146.
249. Id. (the amount of damages for loss of credit must only be established with reasonable
certainty).
250. Henry S. Miller v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992). The court allowed Mr.

Bynum to recover his capital investment of $60,000, which he lost because the space he leased
at a shopping center did not conform to the representations made by Henry S. Miller. The
other types of damages in this list were examples given by the supreme court of damages
allowed under the DTPA in order to make the consumer whole.
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allows them to be determined to a reasonable degree of certainty. 25 While
lost profits will not be allowed when they are too uncertain or speculative, it
is not necessary that lost profits be susceptible to exact calculation. 2 52 In
Holt Atherton Industries,Inc. v. Heine,253 the court held that evidence of lost
profits can be opinions or estimates, but that they "must be based upon objective facts, figures, or data from which the amount of lost profits can be
ascertained." 254 The evidence must not be of lost income, but of lost prof55
its.2
Lost profits, said the court, can be supported by testimony of lost
contracts, but there must be evidence of specific contracts lost and at least
256
one complete calculation of lost profits.
Historically, lost profits were denied when the business was new or unestablished on the theory that there were insufficient facts to forecast the lost
profits to a reasonable degree of certainty. 257 However, in Teletron Energy
Management, Inc. v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,258 the court permitted the recovery of lost profits for a new and established business because there was
market data and expert testimony sufficient to calculate these damages with
25 9
a reasonable degree of certainty.
(2) Cost of repairs
Another element of damages is the cost of repairs. In Hugh Wood Ford,
Inc. v. Galloway26 0 the court allowed the consumer to recover the full
amount he paid to repair a truck when the repairs lacked any value. 261 Also,
Mr. Galloway was able to recover the extra expenses he incurred because the
262
truck was not properly repaired.
Traditionally, a person seeking to recover the cost of remedial repairs has
been required to plead and prove that the repairs were reasonable and necessary. 263 In 1988 this rule was questioned by the supreme court and a suggestion was made that the DTPA may not require proof of reasonable and
necessary repairs since there is no such requirement in the language of the
statute. 264 However, as noted in Ron Craft Chevrolet, Inc. v. Davis,26 5 the
rule has not been abrogated. Furthermore, the courts of appeals have not, as
251. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 1992); Hugh Wood
Ford, Inc. v. Galloway, 830 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
252. Teletron Energy Management, Inc. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 838 S.W.2d 305, 30809 Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ granted).
253. 835 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1992).
254. Id. at 84.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 85.
257. Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 131 Tex. 423, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 1099 (1938).
258. 838 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ granted).
259. Id. at 309.
260. 830 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
261. Id. at 297.
262. Id.
263. Ron Craft Chevrolet, Inc. v. Davis, 836 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992,
writ denied).
264. Jacobs v. Danny Darby Real Estate Inc., 750 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. 1988) (Kilgarlin,
J., concurring).
265. 836 S.W.2d at 676.
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yet, had to face the issue directly because they have been able to find evi266
dence that the repairs were reasonable and necessary.
In Coker v. Burghardt,267 the court allowed Burghardt to testify about the
reasonable cost of repairing his car after it was damaged by Coker's towing
service. Coker argued to the court of appeals that Burghardt should not
have been allowed to testify about repair costs because he was not an expert
in this area. The court held that Burghardt, as a lay witness, could give his
opinion on the amount of damages as long as he testified about matters
within his knowledge. 268 Burghardt stated that he had been driving for eight
years, had owned five cars, and had visited different repair shops to find out
what it would cost to repair his car. Based on this knowledge, Burghardt
testified that it would cost about $1,200 to repair his car. Coker did not
cross-examine Burghardt to determine the basis of his opinions and did not
introduce any controverting evidence regarding the repair cost. In addition,
Coker failed to refute Burghardt's testimony concerning repair costs. The
court, therefore, held that this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
269
award for cost of repairs.
It is not necessary to recovery that the repairs actually have been performed. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates,
Ltd.,270 Jefferson brought suit under the DTPA and for fraud, claiming that
Prudential failed to disclose the presence of asbestos in a building sold to
Jefferson. The jury found Prudential liable and that Jefferson had sustained
actual damages in the amount of $6,023,993.03, which represented the cost
of removing the asbestos from the building. Prudential argued that Jefferson
should be limited to the recovery of his "out-of-pocket" expenses, rather
than the cost of removing the asbestos, since the asbestos was never removed. The court held that because Goldman had shown that the presence
of asbestos diminished the fair market value of the building, he was entitled
to recover the cost of repairing or restoring the property to its full market
value, whether or not the repairs were actually performed.271 The court further held that "out-of-pocket" expenses are just one measure of recovery and
that under the DTPA the consumer is entitled to the greatest recovery
allowable.272
(3) Prejudgment interest
In Celtic Life Insurance Co. v. Coats,273 Mr. Coats recovered a judgment
under the DTPA and Insurance Code for the misrepresentations made by
Celtic Life's agent in his attempts to sell an insurance policy to Mr. Coats.
In addition to trebling the $17,000 the jury found as Mr. Coats's "out-of266. Id. at

676-77.
267. 833 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
268. Id. at 309.

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 310.
839 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ requested).
Id. at 875.
Id.
831 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ granted).
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pocket" expenses resulting from the misrepresentations, the trial court trebled the prejudgment interest that had accrued on the $17,000. Celtic Life
argued to the court of appeals that trebling the prejudgment interest was
contrary to the supreme court's decision in Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 274 In Vail, the court held that prejudgment interest does
not accrue on punitive damages because these are penalties rather than compensatory damages. 275 Celtic Life pointed out to the court that the same
number results when prejudgment interest is trebled as when prejudgment
interest is applied to treble damages. Since the latter is prohibited, Celtic
Life argued, so too must the former.
The court of appeals disagreed and reaffirmed its decision in Paramorev.
Nehring276 that prejudgment interest in subject to trebling under the DTPA
and Insurance Code.277 The court reasoned that, at common law, prejudgment interest is recoverable as compensation for the detention of that which
is due on account of an injury inflicted. 278 Because actual damages recoverable under the DTPA are those damages recoverable at common law, the
court held that prejudgment interest constitutes actual damages under the
DTPA subject to trebling. 279 The court concluded that the legal principles
used to allow for the trebling of prejudgment interest are valid and distinguishable from the legal principle that disallows the application of prejudgment interest to treble damages. 280 Therefore, that both calculations result
in the same number is of no consequence and does not command a conclusion that there is a conflict between Paramore and Coats and the supreme
28 1
court's decision in Vail.
2. Additional (treble) damages
In addition to actual damages, the DTPA allows the trier of fact to award
additional damages up to three times the actual damages if the conduct is
283
committed knowingly. 28 2 In Winkle Chevy-Olds-Pontiac, Inc. v. Condon,
the trial court allowed the consumer to recover treble damages under the
DTPA as well as common law punitive damages for conversion. Winkle and
Condon entered a forty-eight month lease agreement on a van. After approximately thirty months, Winkle repossessed the vehicle. A series of attempts to obtain the return of both the van and the construction tools in the
van were unavailing and Condon filed suit alleging violations of the DTPA,
conversion, and breach of contract. Condon prevailed under both the
DTPA and conversion claims and recovered both DTPA treble damages and
common law punitive damages. The court of appeals upheld both, first not274. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).

275. Id. at 137.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

792 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
Coats, 831 S.W.2d at 599.
Coats, 831 S.W.2d at 599; see also Paramore, 792 S.W.2d at 212.
Coats, 831 S.W.2d at 599; see also Paramore, 792 S.W.2d at 212.
Coats, 831 S.W.2d at 599.
Id.
DTPA § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
830 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ dism'd).
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ing that recovery of both treble and punitive damages is not allowed if each
is based upon the same act or practice. 284 Because the remedies under the
DTPA are cumulative of those provided by other laws, however, if different
and separate acts are alleged and proven, a recovery of treble damages and
punitive damages is permissible. 28 5 In this case, Condon alleged and proved
that Winkle was guilty of conversion by wrongfully taking the van and that
Winkle made misrepresentations at the time of contracting regarding notice
and ownership of the van. Condon obtained separate findings of actual damages under each theory of recovery. Because the award of treble damages
and punitive damages was based on separate jury findings and upon different
acts, the court held that Condon was entitled to both treble damages and
2 86
common law punitive damages.
The treatment of additional damages is somewhat different if suit is
brought under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code or section 17.50(a)(4) of
the DTPA, which incorporates article 21.21. Whereas section 17.50(b)(1)
of the DTPA gives the trier of fact the discretion to award additional damages when the conduct is knowingly committed, section 16 of article 21.21
provides that "the court shall award, in addition [to actual damages], two
times the amount of actual damages" upon a finding of "knowingly. ' 28 7 The
differences between the statutes were explained in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gros.288 As noted by that court, these two statutes were enacted
in 1973 and both contained a provision for mandatory treble damages, without a requirement of "knowing" conduct to trigger such additional damages. 289 In 1979, the DTPA was amended to provide for discretionary

additional damages upon a finding of knowledge. 290 Article 21.21, however,
remained unchanged until 1985. Even then, the award of additional damages remained mandatory, although now a finding of knowingly is required. 29 1 The court also held that the mandatory additional damages
provision of article 21.21 can be used if the consumer brings an action under
section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA, as this section incorporates all of article
21.21.292

In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling,293 the supreme court faced the
issue of whether settlement credits to which a non-settling defendant is entitled should be applied before or after trebling the actual damages. Sterling
bought a large tract of land from Equitable Life Assurance Society to develop as a residential subdivision. As part of the transaction, Sterling sought
to acquire title to three improved homesites. A survey showed that these
284. Id. at 744.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).

288. 818 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
289. Id.at 916-17.
290. Id. at 917.
291. Id.

292. Id.; see also Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 132-33 (Tex.
1988).
293. 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991).
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lots were not owned by Equitable. However, Sterling was assured by an
attorney at Butler & Binion that the survey was incorrect and that Equitable
had title to the three lots. Immediately before signing the closing documents, Sterling obtained assurances from Equitable, Butler & Binion, and
Stewart Title that the three lots were included in the sale. Sterling sued
Stewart Title, Equitable, and Butler & Binion (Equitable's lawyers) upon
learning that he had not received good title on three lots in the large tract.
Equitable and Butler & Binion settled after trial began for $400,000 and
were dismissed from the suit. The jury found that Stewart Title knowingly
engaged in deceptive trade practices and that Sterling sustained $200,000 in
actual damages. Sterling elected recovery under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code in order to have the actual damages trebled. Stewart Title sought
to obtain a pre-trebling credit for the amount paid to Sterling by the other
defendants, which the trial court denied.
The supreme court held that Stewart Title was entitled to a credit under
the "one satisfaction" rule because of the settlement proceeds received from
the other defendants. 294 The court also held, however, that the credits
should be applied only after the actual damages are trebled.2 95 The court
stated that the punitive purpose of trebling would be frustrated by allowing
296
the actual damage amount to be reduced by the credits before trebling.
Because the Insurance Code requires trebling of actual damages, not recoverable damages, application of the "one satisfaction rule" must include recovery of the trebled damages. 297 The court also reasoned that a pre-trebling
credit would discourage settlements since the nonsettling defendant would
298
reap a windfall from the settlements made by other defendants.
3.

Court costs

Section 17.50(d) of the DTPA mandates that a prevailing consumer shall
recover court costs. 29 9 In American Commercial Colleges, Inc. v. Davis,300
the court held that a question about court costs should not be submitted to
the jury because the right to costs is based entirely upon statutes or procedural rules.30 1 In this case, the jury was asked what were the reasonable and
necessary costs. The court held that the trial court should have disregarded
this question because it was immaterial.30 2 However, because Davis did prevail under the DTPA, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment for actual
damages plus court costs.303
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
Id.

298. Id.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

DTPA § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987).
821 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, writ denied).
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 455-56.
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CONTRIBUTION & INDEMNITY

Section 17.555 of the DTPA allows a defendant to seek contribution or
indemnity "from one who, under the statute law or at common law, may
' '3°4
have liability for the damaging event of which the consumer complains.
30
5
In 1989 the supreme court in Plas-Tex, Inc. v. US. Steel Corp. explained
that:
Section 17.55A [now section 15.555] was added to the DTPA as part of
the 1977 amendments. The section was added in response to Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Licht, 544 S.W.2d 442, 447 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1976, no writ), in which the court of civil appeals held
that the right of indemnity was not available under the DTPA. The
statute does not describe the nature of or set the standard for obtaining
the statutory rights to contribution and indemnity. Considering the circumstances under which the section was added and its lack of guidelines, it appears this section was intended to incorporate existing
30 6
principles of contribution and indemnity law into DTPA cases.
Plas-Tex, however, did not explain which of the "existing principles" applied
to DTPA cases.
In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling,30 7 the supreme court decided
that the original contribution statute, enacted in 1917 and now codified in
chapter 32 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, 308 applied to a
case under section 16 of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code, 30 9 which,
310
inter alia, makes actionable violations of section 17.46 of the DTPA.
Before closing on a tract he intended to develop, Sterling was told by the
seller (Equitable), the seller's attorneys (Butler & Binion), and the title insurer (Stewart Title) that three improved and occupied homesites were
within the tract. Unfortunately, they were not. After Stewart Title refused
to pay on the title policy, relying on a policy exception for rights of parties in
possession, Sterling sued Equitable, Butler & Binion, and Stewart Title alleging that all three had violated the DTPA and that Stewart Title had also
violated article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code. Before trial, Equitable
and Butler & Binion settled for $400,000 and Sterling proceeded to trial
against Stewart Title under section 16 of article 21.21. The jury found that
Stewart Title knowingly violated section 17.46 of the DTPA, which is expressly actionable under article 21.21, section 16, and that Sterling's damages, as measured by the fair market value of the three homesites, were
$200,000. The trial court denied Stewart Title's request for a dollar-for-dollar credit for the $400,000 paid by the settling defendants and rendered judgment for Sterling for treble damages and attorney's fees. The court of
304. DTPA § 17.555 (Vernon 1987).
305. 772 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1989).

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991).
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 32.001 (Vernon 1986).
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981).
Stewart Title, 822 S.W.2d at 5-8.
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appeals upheld the denial of the credit. 3 11
The supreme court reversed. 31 2 Though the judgment was based on the
Insurance Code, the court made clear that suits under section 17.50 of the
DTPA are likewise covered by the original contribution statute.
It should be noted that the recent tort reform legislation did not effect
[sic] the original contribution statute. Therefore, the original contribution statute and its 70 year judicial application and interpretation remains valid for all torts outside of the scope of the other contribution
schemes. Additionally, the new contribution legislation did not expand
the underlying theory of Duncan to all torts. The statute specifically
exempts from its scope suits based on the DTPA, the Insurance Code
and intentional torts. Therefore, even under the most recent legislative
enactments in tort reform, these exempted theories of liability are sub31 3
ject to the application of the original contribution statute.
In Willingham Auto World v. Jones, 314 the court held that to receive contribution under the DTPA, there must be a judgment finding the party seeking contribution to be jointly and severally liable with the party from whom
contribution is sought. 3 15 Jones sued Winnebago and Auto World alleging
violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Auto World filed a crossaction against Winnebago seeking indemnity or contribution. Several
months before trial Winnebago paid Jones $8,000 in settlement. The posture
of the parties at trial was an action by Jones against Auto World for recovery of damages for violations of the DTPA and a cross-action by Auto
World against Winnebago for contribution and defense costs. The jury
found that Auto World committed four separate violations of the DTPA in
maintenance and services performed on Jones' vehicle. The jury also found
that this conduct was the producing cause of damages to Jones in the
amount of $2,217. The producing cause and damages questions each contained the following instruction:
You are instructed ...

not to consider any damages which may have

resulted in whole or in part from the actions of Winnebago Industries,
Inc., but shall confine your consideration to those damages, if any,
which you find resulted
only from the conduct of WILLINGHAM
3 16
AUTO WORLD.
Before the case was submitted to the jury, Auto World elected by written
pleading to take as a credit the $8,000 paid in settlement to Jones. The trial
311. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 772 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist]
1989), rev'd in part, 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991).
312. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d at 12 (Tex. 1991).
313. Id. at 6 n.7 (citation omitted).
314. 833 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied). The supreme court granted
writ in the Willingham case (the court later reconsidered and denied the application for writ)
at the same time it granted writ in First Title Co. of Waco v. Garrett, 802 S.W.2d 254 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1990, writ granted), a DTPA case in which the court denied a dollar credit
because the non-settling defendants had not "establish[ed] by proof that [those who settled]
were joint tortfeasors." 802 S.W.2d at 263.
315. Id. at 234.
316. 833 S.W.2d at 233.
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court denied the credit. Citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins,317 the court
of appeals held that Auto World was not entitled to contribution because
there was no judgment or findings by the trial court that Winnebago was a
joint tortfeasor with Auto World. 3 18 Without such a finding, according to
3 19
the court, Auto World was not entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit.
H.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

In addition to court costs, DTPA section 17.50(d) provides that a prevailing consumer shall recover reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees. 320 The
cases during the Survey period dealt with segregation of fees and the proof
required that they are reasonable and necessary.
In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling,321 the supreme court stated the
rules relating to the segregation of fees, both between claims and between
parties. First, the court stated that
[w]hen a plaintiff seeks to recover attorney's fees in cases where there
are multiple defendants, and one or more of those defendants have
made settlements, the plaintiff must segregate the fees owed by the remaining defendants from those owed by the settling defendants so that
the remaining
defendants are not charged fees for which they are not
322
responsible.
Second, the court acknowledged that "a recognized exception to this duty to
segregate [between fee shifting and non-fee shifting claims] arises when the
attorney's fees rendered are in connection with claims arising out of the
same transaction and are so interrelated that their 'prosecution or defense
entails proof or denial of essentially the same facts.' "323 Because the plaintiff's expert on attorney's fees testified that "some of the fees incurred were
'primarily related' to one defendant rather than to both and that a 'large
majority' of the fees were incurred as a result of 'fighting' Butler & Binion
and Equitable[,]"' 324 the court found that "the attorney's fees are capable of
segregation. ' 325 The court ruled that where reversal is required because of a
failure to segregate, the appellate court should remand the case for determination of fees rather than rendering judgment for the party against whom
326
fees are sought.
In Leggett v. Brinson,327 the trial court took judicial notice of the reasonableness of the consumer's attorney's fees and awarded attorney's fees in a
judgment based solely upon DTPA violations. On appeal, the defendant argued that the award of attorney's fees should be reversed because the DTPA
317.
318.
319.
320.

739 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1987).
Willingham Auto World, 833 S.W.2d at 235.
Id. at 234-35.
DTPA § 17.50 (Vernon 1987).

321. 822 S.W.2d I (Tex. 1991).
322. Id. at 10-11.

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id. at 11.
Id.at 12.
Id.
Id.at 11-12.
817 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
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does not provide for judicial notice of reasonable attorney's fees. The court
of appeals agreed that the trial court may not take judicial notice of reasonable attorney's fees under the DTPA and that there must be evidence to
support such a recovery. 328 The court, however, refused to render a take
nothing judgment on attorney's fees, but remanded for a determination of
the reasonableness of the fees to be awarded. 329 Even though there was no
evidence of reasonable attorney's fees, the court held that a remand was in
order because attorney's fee are mandatory under the DTPA and because
the trial court determined the amount under the erroneous theory of judicial
330
notice.
A court reached the opposite result in American Commercial Colleges,
Inc. v. Davis. 3 3 1 In this case, the consumer's attorney testified about the
amount of time he had spent on the case and the amount of his hourly
charges. No testimony indicated, however, the reasonableness and necessity
of the attorney's fees. The court of appeals found the evidence insufficient to
support an award of attorney's fees under the DTPA and reversed and rendered. 332 The court held that, even though attorneys' fees are mandatory for
the winning consumer, even under the DTPA there must be evidence of reasonableness and necessity to support a fee award. 33 3 If no such evidence
3 34
exists, the court continued, the appellate court should reverse and render.
In reaching its decision, the court distinguished Satellite Earth Stations East,
Inc. v. Davis, 335 the case relied upon both by the consumer in this case and
the court in Leggett v. Brinson. A remand was warranted in Satellite, reasoned the court, because the jury found the reasonable attorney's fees to be
zero even though there was evidence of reasonable and necessary attorney's
fees. Here, however, there was no such evidence. Thus, according to the
court, a remand was not permissible.3 3 6 In light of the supreme court's decision in Stewart Title, the refusal to remand the fee issue appears to be wrong.
I.

LIMITATIONS

All actions brought under the DTPA must be brought "within two years
after the date on which the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice
occurred or within two years after the consumer discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurrence of the
false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice. ' 337 Even though this limitation provision speaks only of "false, misleading, or deceptive acts," which is
but one of the causes of action provided under section 17.50, the courts have
328. Id. at 157.
329. Id.

330. Id.
331. 821 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, writ denied).
332. Id. at 455-56.
333. Id. at 455.

334. Id.
335, 756 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, writ denied).
336. American Commercial Colleges, 821 S.W.2d at 455.
337. DTPA § 17.565 (Vernon 1987).
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held that all DTPA actions are subject to these limitations. 338
As one would expect, most of the limitations cases during the Survey period involved application of the discovery rule contained in section 17.565.
In McDade v. Texas Commerce Bank, 339 for example, the court held that the
statute of limitations on the bank customer's DTPA express warranty claim
did not begin until the customer discovered the bank's error in failing to
deposit the funds in a non-taxable retirement account as the bank had represented it would do. 34 0 The jury, however, found that McDade did not discover the bank's error until January 30, 1986, which was within two years of
the date he filed suit.
The court of appeals upheld this finding. 34 1 The evidence showed that
McDade had first learned of a problem prior to that date, when he received a
1099 tax form relating to the account. However, he believed this was simply
an error on the form and not a reflection that he did not have an IRA. Only
after he went to the bank and learned the account was not an IRA did McDade realize that the bank's error. A bank employee testified that when he
told McDade that the account was not an IRA, McDade seemed disturbed
and surprised. The court held that this evidence supported the jury finding,
even though other evidence supported that McDade had said he learned
sometime around the middle of January that the account was not an IRA,
34 2
and this discovery date would have made his suit untimely.
In Southwestern Bell Media, Inc. v. Lyles, 34 3 the court allowed a consumer
of a Yellow Pages ad to take advantage of the discovery rule. Bell filed suit
against Lyles in July 1988, for breach of two agreements for advertising in
the 1986 and 1987 Yellow Pages. In April 1990 Lyles amended his answer
to add a counterclaim for breach of contract and violations of the DTPA.
Lyles alleged that Bell accepted money intended as payment for new advertising, but applied the money to a disputed account for old advertising, misrepresented its application of the money, and excluded his advertisements
from the 1988 Yellow Pages. After a trial to the court, Bell was granted
recovery for the advertising and Lyles recovered on his DTPA counterclaim.
After offsetting the awards, the court ordered Bell to pay Lyles about
344
$78,000. The court of appeals affirmed.
Bell argued that Lyles' counterclaim was barred by the statute of limitations. The basis of Lyles' DTPA claim was that Bell misrepresented that it
would accept a $5,000 deposit for 1988 advertising and then applied it to his
balance on his 1986 and 1987 accounts, and misrepresented the possibility of
338. Darr Equipment Co. v. Allen, 824 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied) (breach of implied warranty of good and workmanlike repairs); Cal Fed Mortgage Co. v.
Street, 824 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied) (misrepresentations); McDade
v. Texas Commerce Bank, 822 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied)
(breach of express warranty).
339. 822 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
340. Id. at 719.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 720-21.
343. 825 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
344. Id. at 495.
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advertising in the 1988 directory. Bell argued that Lyles' counterclaim was
barred because it was filed more than two years after December 7, 1987, the
date the alleged misrepresentations were made. The court recognized that
Lyles carried the burden to plead and prove that the date he discovered the
misrepresentations was less than two years prior to his filing suit. Lyles argued that he could not reasonably have discovered the misrepresentations
prior to May 8, 1988, when he was told that the book was closed and his ad
was not included. Bell argued that Lyles knew or should have known of the
misrepresentations long before May 8, 1988, since on January 4, 1988,
Southwestern Bell sent him an invoice showing that the $5,000 payment had
been applied to his past due balance and an advertising form indicating that
the ad had been "zeroed out." Bell had also sent collection letters on February 4, and March 1, stating that Lyles' account was seriously delinquent and
his future advertising privileges had been canceled.
The court also noted, however, that Lyles testified that Bell representatives assured him that he would be issued credits and adjustments on his
outstanding balance and asked him to disregard computer-generated billings
that he would receive. These representatives also assured Lyles that he
would have no problem getting his advertisement into the 1988 Yellow
Pages directory. Additionally, in February 1988, Bell accepted the advertising copy for the 1988 book from Lyles, during which time negotiations were
on-going for an adjustment to the past due account due to errors in the prior
ads. After Lyles rejected Bell's offer of a 20% adjustment, Bell told Lyles
that his ad would not appear in the 1988 directory. Based on this evidence,
the court of appeals held that the trial court properly determined that Lyles
could not have reasonably discovered the misrepresentations prior to May 8,
346
1988. 345 Thus, Lyles' DTPA claim was not time-barred.
In DarrEquipment Co. v. Allen, 347 the court held that limitations began to
run when the consumer discovered the nature of the injury even though all
the elements of his cause of action were not discovered. 348 In April of 1984,
Darr performed an engine overhaul on a 1981 Freightliner truck owned by
Lahon. The overhaul included the replacement of the connecting rod and
wrist pin bushings. Darr used a method of inserting the bushings in the
connecting rod that deviated from the method recommended by Caterpillar,
345. Id.
346. Id. Justice O'Connor dissented, asserting that Lyles discovered or should have discovered the misrepresentation prior to May 8, 1988, and therefore, his counterclaim was
barred by limitations. According to the dissent, Lyles discovered the misrepresentation as
early as February 4, 1988, when he received a contract and a letter from Southwestern Bell
showing that Lyles had no 1988 advertising. Then on March 1, 1988, Lyles received a final
notice from Southwestern Bell that his delinquent account had been fully accelerated and that
he was disqualified from future advertisement. Justice O'Connor wrote that even if these items
did not provide actual notice to Lyles, they would have caused a reasonably prudent person to
make an inquiry about the status of the advertisement in the 1988 book. Justice O'Connor
claimed that the majority did not apply the reasonably prudent person test, but took at face
value Lyles' statement that he did not understand that his advertisement was not in the Yellow
Pages until May 8, 1988. Id. at 499-502.
347. 824 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied).
348. Id. at 713.
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the manufacturer of the engine. Lahon sold the truck to Don Drum Equipment Company, which sold it to Allen on May 18, 1984. In December of.
1984, Allen took the truck to West Texas Equipment Company when water
began to appear in the oil. West Texas performed an engine overhaul but
did not replace the wrist pin bushings because an inspection showed no need
to replace them.
On April 5, 1985, Allen again took the truck to West Texas Equipment to
determine the cause of a knocking sound. On that day, Allen examined the
partially disabled engine and saw that the wrist pin bushings had turned or
rotated, had moved out of alignment, and had become discolored from the
heat, causing the internal parts of the engine to wear against each other.
Allen refused to pay for the repairs claiming they were caused by the negligent work previously performed by West Texas. On April 20, 1985, Darr
informed Allen that the wrist pin bushings were not installed in the manner
prescribed by Caterpillar. On July 26, 1985, West Texas filed suit against
Allen for the cost of the April repairs. Allen filed a general denial and a
counterclaim against West Texas for negligent repairs. On April 10, 1987,
Allen joined Darr as a third party defendant alleging negligence in the installation of the wrist pin bushings and a breach of implied warranty of service
in violation of the DTPA. Darr asserted the defense of statute of limitations.
On the day of trial, Allen confessed judgment to West Texas leaving only
his claims against Darr. The jury found that Darr was negligent and
breached an implied warranty of service and awarded Allen $13,950 in actual damages, $27,000 in punitive damages, and $20,000 for attorney's fees.
Darr appealed contending that Allen's claims were barred by the two year
349
statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed and rendered.
The court held that Allen had to commence his breach of implied warranty under the DTPA within two years after the date on which the breach
of warranty occurred or within two years after Allen discovered or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the breach of warranty. 350 The court noted Allen's admission that he discovered his damages
and the injury causing them no later than April 5, 1985, which was more
than two years prior to the filing of his action against Darr. Allen argued
that limitations should not have started running until April 20, 1985, the
date upon which he discovered that Darr had improperly installed the wrist
pin bushings. The court held that the limitations period started running on
April 5, 1985, the day Allen discovered the malfunction of the wrist pin
35
bushings, even though he did not know the cause of the malfunction. '
Allen further argued that he was entitled to recover under the common
law implied warranty, which is governed by a four year period of limitations.
The court held that Allen's breach of warranty claim was governed by the
two year limitations period under the DTPA. 35 2 The court cited Melody
349. Id.

350. Id. at 712.
351. Id.
352. Id.
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Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes353 for the proposition that the implied
warranty to provide good and workmanlike service is available to consumers
354
suing under the DTPA.
The Houston court of appeals (First District) had two occasions to write
on the issue of the discovery rule in the context of a motion for summary
judgment. 355 In Bowe v. GeneralMotors Corp.,35 6 the court reversed a summary judgment based on limitations rendered in favor of GM and its dealer,
Wiesner. 35 7 The plaintiff, Bowe, sued GM and Wiesner under the DTPA for
failure to properly repair a car and failure to build the car in a good and
workmanlike manner. Bowe purchased a GM car from Wiesner in June
1987. In July 1987, the car overheated twice and by October 1987, the air
conditioner completely quit working. In February 1988, Mr. Bowe took the
car to a local Exxon station to have the air conditioner checked and freon
added. The air conditioner still did not work, so on March 14, 1988, Bowe
took the car to the Wiesner service department. After mechanics worked on
the car, the air conditioner worked occasionally, going on and off unpredictably. Thus, Bowe returned the car two days later to Wiesner. Wiesner told
them he could find nothing wrong with the car.
In April 1988, Mrs. Bowe took the car to Wiesner because of the air conditioner. The service representative told her she was having hot flashes and
that nothing was wrong with the car. The air conditioner continued to go on
and off, so Bowe went back to Wiesner on April 25, 1988. This time
Wiesner indicated the problem was the pressure switch and assured Bowe
that it would be fixed. When Bowe picked up the car, however, the air conditioner still did not work properly. On May 20, 1988, Bowe once again
returned the car to Wiesner at which time the dealer taped two wires together, replaced another pressure switch, and represented that the car had
been repaired. The air conditioner continued to work unpredictably. In November 1988, the brakes began squealing and the engine overheated again.
On February 17, 1989, the car suddenly died and Exxon replaced the fuel
pump, the timer, and the gas screen. In March 1989, the air conditioner
would not come on, and Wiesner replaced another pressure switch. Mr.
Bowe took the car back in on April 6, 1989 because the horn was blowing
without warning, the engine was hesitating, and the air conditioner was not
working. Mr. Bowe was told that the car had a bad electrical system and
that it was impossible to find the cause of an electrical system problem. The
problems with the car continued for the remainder of 1989 and throughout
1990. The cruise control stopped working, the air conditioner did not function properly, the engine overheated at low speeds, the car vibrated, the bat353. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
354. Darr, 824 S.W.2d at 712 (citing Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 354).
355. See Bowe v. General Motors Corp., 830 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1992, writ denied); Buffington v. Lewis, 834 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ).
356. 830 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).

357. Id. at 779.
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tery and alternator had to be replaced, the horn blew unexpectedly, and
Bowe finally learned that the engine block was cracked.
Bowe brought suit under the DTPA on May 22, 1990. GM and Wiesner
sought a summary judgment based upon limitations and thus had the burden
of proving as a matter of law that Bowe discovered the nature of his injury
more than two years prior to filing suit. 358 GM and Wiesner argued that the
Bowes should have discovered their injuries in the summer and fall of 1987
when they first had difficulties with the engine overheating and the air conditioner malfunctioning. The court held that these problems alone could not,
as a matter of law, give rise to a cause of action for failure to build a car in a
good and workmanlike manner. 359 Furthermore, in 1987, it would have
been impossible for the Bowes to discover the failure to repair the car because the first repairs were not made until early 1988. 36 0 GM and Wiesner
then argued that the Bowes knew about their injury by May 20, 1988, because at that point, they had taken their car to Wiesner five times to have the
air conditioner repaired. The court found no authority for finding, as a matter of law, that the Bowes should have discovered the failure to repair the air
conditioner after five failed attempts. 36' Because a genuine issue of fact existed concerning the date on which the Bowes should have discovered or
actually did discover their injuries, the court of appeals held it improper for
the trial court to grant summary judgment based on the statute of
362
limitations.
The court also reversed summary judgment based on statute of limitations
on DTPA claims in Buffington v. Lewis, 363 because there was a material fact
issue regarding when the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the defects in the house and the extent of the defects.364 Buffington alleged that
Lewis had sold him a house without revealing it had a defective sewer system and a fractured foundation. Buffington filed suit approximately eightand-one-half years after the date the home was purchased. Lewis asserted
that the statute of limitations barred Buffington's right to recover and the
court granted a summary judgment on this issue. With respect to Buffington's DTPA claims, the court noted that the statute of limitations begins to
run when the plaintiff either discovered, or should have discovered, the acts
giving rise to the cause of action. 365 In support of his motion for summary
judgment, Lewis referred to Buffington's admission that at the time the
house was purchased, Buffington knew of one stress crack on an outside wall
of the house. Buffington countered with an affidavit stating that he had no
reason to discover the full extent of the defects until April 25, 1988, when a
registered professional engineer conducted a structural inspection of the
358. Id. at 788.
359. Id.

360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 779.
363. 834 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).

364. Id. at 605.
365. Id. at 603.
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home. The alleged defects included brick, mortar, and foundation cracks;
severe deflection and binding in the window frames; settlement in the sidewalk; slow failure in the retaining walls; severe seepage through the basement walls; and septic sum discharge pit problems. The court concluded
that this affidavit created a material fact issue regarding when Buffington
366
knew, or should have known, of the defects and the extent of the defects.
Even though Buffington knew of one minor defect, he did not know of the
severity of the defects until April 1988, which was about one year prior to
the date suit was filed. The court held, however, that the statute of limitations barred Buffington's breach of warranty claim because it was not
brought within four years of the sale of the home.367 Rather than applying
the limitations and discovery rule found in the DTPA or at common law for
warranty actions, the court looked to the U.C.C. limitations provisions.
Buffington's warranty claim, however, could not have arisen under the
U.C.C. because the U.C.C. applies only to the sale of "goods" and a house is
not a "good" under the U.C.C. definition. 368 The only implied warranty
Buffington could have alleged to have been breached is one that developed
under
the common law, such as breach of implied warranty of habitability.3 69 The court relied on Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp.370 for
the proposition that a breach of implied warranty action accrues at the time
of delivery and that the discovery rule does not apply unless the warranty
involves future performance. 37 1 Safeway Stores, however, dealt with a
U.C.C. implied warranty, not a common law implied warranty. Because the
U.C.C. did not apply, the U.C.C. provisions regarding delivery and future
performance did not govern the warranty in Buffington. Applicable instead
was the four-year limitations period, which does not begin to run until the
372
buyer discovers, or should have discovered, the injury.
In Parker v. Yen, 3 7 3 the court held that a defendant seeking a summary
judgment on a DTPA claim based upon limitations must first negate the
discovery rule. 374 That is, the defendant must conclusively show that the
consumer knew or should have known of the alleged deceptive acts more
than two years prior to the filing of suit.375 Mr. Parker brought suit on
behalf of his wife, who was rendered an invalid in an automobile accident.
Mr. Parker alleged that Mr. Yen, a pharmacist, misfilled a prescription and
gave Mrs. Parker a fast-acting sleeping aid rather than the drug prescribed
366. Id. at 605.
367. Id. at 603.
368. G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1982) (U.C.C. applies only to
sales of goods; house is not a good since it is not moveable), overruled on other grounds, Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 708 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
369. See Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983); Humber v. Morton,
426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
370. 710 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1986).
371. Buffington, 834 S.W.2d at 603.
372. Richman v. Watel, 565 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), writ ref'd n.r.e. per
curiam, 576 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1978).
373. 823 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
374. Id. at 362-63.

375. Id. at 363.
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by her doctor. As a result, Mrs. Parker fell asleep while driving her car and
collided with another vehicle. The prescription was misfilled on May 7,
1987, the accident occurred two days later, and suit was filed on July 11,
1989. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment on limitations
because Mr. Yen did not show when the Parkers knew or should have
376
known of the alleged deceptive acts.
The date on which a cause of action accrues is critical for the determination of whether the claim is barred by limitations. In Cal Fed Mortgage Co.
v. Street,377 the court held that a borrower had to sue a bank within two
years of the date the bank reneged on loan commitment and thus could not
wait until he suffered damages by having to pay on a substituted recourse
note. 78 Street wanted to buy property in Austin and received an informal
loan commitment from Cal Fed for a $3.7 million nonrecourse note. Street
testified that the Cal Fed loan officer, Dannatt, assured him that formal approval would be forthcoming, although not until the day after closing.
Based on this assurance, Street signed a recourse note with Texas Commerce
Bank for interim financing. The deal closed, and the next day Cal Fed refused to make the loan. This took place on October 23, 1984. Over the next
couple of years, rent from the property was sufficient to pay the TCB loan,
so Street did not complain to Cal Fed. After a major tenant left the building,
income was not sufficient to pay the loan. In 1988 the property was worth
less than the $3.2 million purchase price, and Street had to sell the property
and contribute funds of his own to pay TCB's note. Street sued Cal Fed in
March 1988, claiming that, but for Cal Fed's misrepresentations, he would
never have signed the recourse note to TCB nor purchased the property. Cal
Fed argued that Street's claim was barred by limitations. The court of appeals agreed and rendered a take nothing judgment against Street. 379 The
court of appeals began by noting that DTPA section 17.565 requires that
suit be brought within two years from the date the deceptive act occurs or
within two years of the date the plaintiff discovers the act. 380 In this case,
Street admitted he knew of Cal Fed's misconduct on October 23, 1984, but
did not file suit until more than two years later. The court rejected Street's
argument that limitations under the DTPA did not begin running until he
suffered damages upon having to use his own personal funds to pay on the
note. The court reasoned:
If the legislature had intended limitations in DTPA actions to run from
the date a consumer suffers damages, that intention could easily have
been expressed in specific terms. Indeed, most statutes of limitations
require that suit be brought within a specified period of time after the
cause of action "accrues."..... In the DTPA, however, the legislature
did not use such language, but instead expressly made the limitations
period begin to run when the deceptive act or practice occurred or when
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

Id.
824 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 624.
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.We may not

ignore the legislature's express language: "It is the duty of courts to
construe a law as written, and, if possible, ascertain its intention from
the language used therein, and not look for extraneous reasons to be
used as a basis for reading into a'38law
an intention not expressed nor
1
intended to be expressed therein.
Alternatively, the court held that Street's claim would be barred under the
common-law "legal injury rule."'38 2 The court held that Street suffered a
legal injury at the time he learned of the misrepresentation and that limitations began to run at that point, even if his damages were not determinable
until later.38 3 Finally, the court held that if actual damages were necessary
to start limitations running, Street suffered actual damages on October 23,
1984, because the TCB loan carried a higher rate of interest than the prom384
ised Cal Fed loan.
The Cal Fed Mortgage court's use of the "legal injury" rule and its refusal
to use the suffering of actual damages as the trigger for commencement of
limitations seem at odds with the language and purpose of the DTPA. It is
true that DTPA section 17.565 refers to the date the conduct "occurred,"
but the limitations section cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the
statute. The supreme court has stated that, in interpreting the DTPA, "[t]he
fundamental rule controlling the construction of a statute is to ascertain the
intention of the Legislature ... [and] [t]hat intention should be ascertained

from the entire act, and not from isolated portions thereof.' 38 5 What this
means is that section 17.565 must be read together with section 17.50, which
states that "[a] consumer may maintain an action where any of the following
constitute a producing cause of actual damages. ' 38 6 No suit can be brought
without a plaintiff who has suffered actual damages. That being so, the two
year limitations period cannot begin to run until actual damages have been
suffered. To rule that the limitations clock begins ticking even before the
statute permits the filing of a suit would produce an absurd result and contravene the express statutory mandate to construe the statute liberally to
protect consumers. 387 The DTPA's use of "actual damages" in the cause of
action section, section 17.50, also precludes use of the "legal injury rule" to
start the limitations period. Again, the DTPA does not permit a suit when
only "legal injury" (a term whose practical meaning is, charitably speaking,
less than clear) has occurred. "Actual" damages must have been sustained.
J.

BAD FAITH, HARASSING AND GROUNDLESS SUIT

Section 17.50(c) of the DTPA provides "[o]n a finding by the court that
381. Id.at 625 (citation omitted).
382. Id.at 627.

383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1977) (emphasis added) (quoting City
of Mason v. West Texas Utilities Co., 150 Tex. 18, 237 S.W.2d 273, 278 (1951)).
386. DTPA § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added).
387. DTPA § 17.44 (Vernon 1987).
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an action under this section was groundless and brought in bad faith, or
brought for the purpose of harassment, the court shall award to the defend38 8
ant reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and court costs."9
"Groundless" under this section means a claim having "no basis in law or
fact, and not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."3 8 9 The standard for determining whether a
suit is groundless is "whether the totality of the tendered evidence demonstrates an arguable basis in fact and law for the consumer's claim."' 390 An
example of a suit brought in bad faith is one motivated by malicious or discriminatory purpose. 39' Whether a suit is groundless or brought in bad faith
392
is a question of law for the court, not the jury.
Applying these principles, the court in Selig v. BMW of North America,
Inc.3 93 held that Selig's DTPA claim was groundless and brought in bad
faith. 394 About six months after purchasing a new BMW, Selig claimed that
it suddenly accelerated as she attempted to stop, causing the BMW to collide
with a parked vehicle and the side of a building. The court looked at the
following facts in affirming the summary judgment against Selig, finding the
suit groundless and brought in bad faith:
(1) Selig failed to designate an expert witness to prove a defect that
could have caused her damages;
(2) Selig failed to depose BMW's liability experts;
(3) Selig served BMW with meaningless but voluminous discovery
requests;
(4) Selig made unnecessary objections obstructing discovery;
(5) Selig opposed special exceptions requesting specification of the
amount of damages;
(6) Following the trial court's order requesting the release of Selig's
psychological records, Selig's counsel contacted the psychologist
and advised him not to release the records; and
(7) Selig lost her case before the Texas
Motor Vehicle Commission,
39 5
which found no defect in the car.
The court also rejected Selig's argument that BMW's bad faith counterclaim
was barred by the statute of limitations because it was not brought within
two years of her purchase of the car. The court held that limitations on a
bad faith counterclaim begin to run when the DTPA cause of action is
388. DTPA § 17.50(c) (Vernon 1987).
389. Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex. 1989) (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 13); see Selig v. BMW of North America, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 95, 103 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); CEDA Corp. v. City of Houston, 817 S.W.2d 846,
848 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Elbaor v. Sanderson, 817 S.W.2d 826,
828 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
390. Selig, 832 S.W.2d at 103 (quoting Splettstosser v. Myer, 779 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex.
1989)).
391. Id.; see Kazmir v. Suburban Homes Realty, 824 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied); Elbaor, 817 S.W.2d at 829.
392. Selig, 832 S.W.2d at 103; Elbaor, 817 S.W.2d at 830.
393. 832 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
394. Id. at 104.
395. Id.
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In Elbaor v. Sanderson,397 the court of appeals likewise affirmed a judg398
ment that a DTPA claim was groundless and brought in bad faith.
Elbaor invested in an oil well through Sanderson, a promoter. After the well
failed to produce to his satisfaction, Elbaor sued alleging that Sanderson had
misrepresented the investment and earning potential of the well. The jury,
however, found that Sanderson did not make misrepresentations or conceal
information. The trial court found Elbaor's suit was groundless and brought
in bad faith and awarded Sanderson attorney's fees. The court of appeals
held that the standard for reviewing the finding by the trial court that a suit
is groundless, brought in bad faith, or brought for harassment is whether the
trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. 399 The court of appeals
concluded that the trial court did not act unreasonably in finding Elbaor's
suit was groundless and brought in bad faith, based upon the following
facts. 4° ° Elbaor alleged that Sanderson represented that the well was already
producing when Elbaor invested. On cross-examination, however, Elbaor
admitted this allegation was not true. Elbaor also alleged that Sanderson
made warranties regarding the well, but evidence showed Elbaor had signed
a written statement saying that no representations, warranties, or guarantees
had been made regarding the profits or losses from the investment. Elbaor
additionally alleged that Sanderson misrepresented that the investment
would reduce his tax liability. In fact, the investment did reduce his tax
liability. Finally, Elbaor alleged that Sanderson made a written guarantee of
the rate of the return on the well, and oral guarantees. Elbaor, however,
produced no evidence of any written guarantee. Additionally, the evidence
showed that Elbaor had prior experience in investing in oil wells and that the
high risk of such investments was common knowledge.
In CEDA Corp. v. City of Houston,40" the court upheld a finding that a

DTPA claim was not groundless or brought in bad faith. 40 2 CEDA Corp.
was involved in repairing HUD homes for the city of Houston. One of the
houses CEDA bid to repair was Mary Burton's. The city inspectors approved the work done by CEDA, and CEDA was paid. A few years later,
the city learned that some contractors under the HUD program had done
substandard work or had charged for work that they had never done. After
a reinspection of Burton's house, the city determined that CEDA's work was
substandard. The city made the necessary repairs and then took an assignment of Burton's suit against CEDA under the DTPA. CEDA counterclaimed, asserting that the city's suit was groundless and brought in bad
faith or for harassment. Ultimately, Burton's claims against CEDA were
dismissed, and CEDA proceeded on its claims. The trial court denied relief
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Id. at 103.
817 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
Id. at 830.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 828-30.
817 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
Id. at 848-49.
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on CEDA's DTPA counterclaim. CEDA argued that the trial court should
have awarded fees on the DTPA counterclaim, because city inspectors found
CEDA's work to be satisfactory and had approved it. In addition, Burton
testified about her satisfaction with the work done by CEDA on her home.
Some evidence also indicated, however, that upon reinspection, the city discovered CEDA had not performed its contract in a workmanlike manner
because it found numerous defects in the plumbing and electrical work done
by CEDA. According to the court of appeals, this evidence showed that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the city's suit was not
40 3
groundless.
In Kazmir v. Suburban Homes Realty,4° 4 Kazmir and others sued Suburban Homes Realty for allegedly selling them homes built on or near an active geological fault. The plaintiffs purchased the homes between 1977 and
1984. The subdivision was completed in 1977 or 1978. Plaintiffs filed suit in
April 1988, and Suburban Homes was granted a summary judgment based
on the statute of repose that protects engineers from being sued more than
ten years after the substantial completion of improvements. 405 The trial
court also rendered summary judgment for Kazmir on Suburban's bad faith
counterclaim. The court of appeals reversed, finding a fact issue since it
appeared that some of the homeowners discovered their problems more than
ten years before they filed suit and were aware that limitations was a problem.40 6 The court held this raised a fact question on whether at least some of
the plaintiffs' claims were groundless or brought in bad faith or for the pur4 7
pose of harassment. 0
K.

SURVIVABILITY OF

DTPA

CLAIMS

In Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,4° 8 the Fifth Circuit confronted the
issue of whether a consumer's cause of action under the DTPA survives his
death. In this case, the jury awarded damages under the DTPA for a teenager, crushed to death by a garage door when the opener failed to stop or
retract the door upon coming into contact with the boy. Sears argued that
the teenager's DTPA action did not survive his death. The Fifth Circuit
noted that three Texas courts of appeals have addressed the question of
whether a cause of action under the DTPA survives to the estate of
a consumer; two holding that such an action does survive, one holding
that it does not. 4° 9 Because the Texas Supreme Court has yet to rule on this
403.
404.
405.
406.

Id.
824 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.008 (Vernon 1986).
Id. at 247.

407. Id.
408. 970 F.2d 1420 (5th Cir. 1992).
409. Id. at 1427. (citing Thomes v. Porter, 761 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1988, no writ) (DTPA action does survive); Mahan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Hall, 648
S.W.2d 324, 333 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (DTPA action does
survive); First Nat'l Bank v. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d 218, 220-21 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984, no writ) (DTPA action does not survive)).
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issue,410 the Fifth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of
4 11
Texas.
The resolution of this issue consistent with the language, purpose and policies of the DTPA would be to allow DTPA claims to survive the death of
the consumer. In Mahan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Hall,41 2 the court relied on the

Texas Survival Statute 41 3 in holding that DTPA claims survive the death of
the consumer. 41 4 The survival statute abrogated the common law rule that
an action for personal injuries does not survive the death of an injured perpersonal injury damages, the
son. Clearly, where the cause of action is for
41 5
survival statute preserves the DTPA claim.
DTPA claims were also held survivable in Thomes v. Porter,41 6 but because the damages were not for personal injuries, the survival statute did not
apply. Instead the court considered the nature and purposes of the DTPA.
The court noted that the survival of a cause of action depends on whether it
is controlled by common law principles or a statute that provides for survival. 41 7 Because the DTPA does not provide for survival, the court applied
the common rules of survival, which focus on the nature of the cause of
action. At common law, the court stated, actions in contract, fraud, and
deceit survived the death of either party. The court characterized the DTPA
as "an amalgam of common law fraud, contracts, and tort considerations,"
and, therefore, a DTPA claim should also survive the death of a consumer.41 8 The court reasoned further that survival is necessary to fulfill the
purposes of the DTPA, "which are to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive trade practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches
of warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure
such protection. ' 41 9 The court held that frustration of the purposes of the
DTPA would occur if violations could escape the DTPA merely because the
4 20
consumer dies.
The San Antonio court also had occasion to write on this issue and held
that DTPA claims do not survive the death of the consumer in First National Bank v. Hackworth.4 21 To reach this conclusion the court first determined that the DTPA is punitive, rather than remedial, in nature since it
410. The supreme court expressly reserved for another day the discussion of survival of
DTPA claims in Shell Oil Co. v. Chapman, 682 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. 1984).
411. Wellborn, 970 F.2d at 1427. On December 9, 1992, the Texas Supreme Court granted
the parties' joint motion to dismiss the appeal and, accordingly, dismissed the certified question "without reference to the merits." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wellborn, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
296 (Tex., Dec. 12, 1992).
412. 648 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
413. Acts 1925, p. 299, 39th Leg., ch. 115, § 2 (amended 1927) (current version at TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002 (Vernon 1986)).
414. Mahan, 648 S.W.2d at 333.
415. Id.
416. 761 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
417. Id.at 594.
418. Id.
419. Id. (quoting DTPA § 17.44 (Vernon 1987)).
420. Id.
421. 673 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
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allows for treble damages and attorney's fees. The court then noted that the
law views the right to recover punitive damages as a purely personal right
that terminates at the death of the injured person. In a similar fashion, the
422
San Antonio court held that DTPA claims do not survive.
Both the dissent in Hackworth and the court in Thomes v. Porterrejected
42 3
this notion that the DTPA is punitive rather than remedial in nature.
Both courts relied upon the holding of Pennington v. Singleton424 that the
legislature provided for extra damage recovery under the DTPA so that consumers will have incentive to pursue their claims and to deter violations of
the act.4 25 The Fort Worth court thus held that "the punitive aspect of the
additional damages permitted under the DTPA is but one cog in the overall
scheme enacted by the legislature to protect consumers from deceptive trade
practices. The public policy for exemplary damages includes equally impor'4 26
tant considerations other than punishment of the wrongdoer.
A few months after the San Antonio court decided Hackworth, the
supreme court decided Hofer v. Lavender.427 In Hofer the court held that by
enacting the survival statute, the legislature discarded the common law rule
against the survivability of punitive damage claims. 428 The court also held
that punishment of the wrongdoer is just one of the purposes of exemplary
damages, another one being to serve as an example to others. 429 Thus, even
when the tortfeasor cannot be punished because he has died, still the imposition of exemplary damages can serve as an example to others and deter similar behavior. Similarly, a DTPA claim should not be extinguished by the
death of a consumer, because one of the purposes of the DTPA is to eliminate deceptive trade practices throughout the marketplace, not just the be430
havior of the defendant being sued.
Another common law test for survival, mentioned by none of these courts,
is whether or not the cause of action may be assigned. At common law, if a
cause of action could be assigned, it would survive the death of either party.
A cause of action for damages resulting from personal injuries is a property
right and may be assigned, as can any other cause of action except where
such assignment is expressly prohibited by statute.4 3' Because no statute
prohibits the assignment of a DTPA action, it should survive the consumer's
32
death. 4
422. Id. at 221.
423. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d at 227 (Tijerina, J., dissenting); Thomes, 761 S.W.2d at 595.
424. 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
425. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d at 227 (Tijerina, J., dissenting); Thomes, 761 S.W.2d at 595.
426. Thomes, 761 S.W.2d at 595 (citation omitted).
427. 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
428. Id. at 475.
429. Id. at 474.
430. Thomes, 761 S.W.2d at 595.
431. Bradshaw v. Baylor University, 126 Tex. 99, 103, 84 S.W.2d 703, 704-05 (1935) (assignment to tortfeasor of injured party's cause of action against another tortfeasor is not void
as against public policy), overruled on other grounds, Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
432. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 610 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (DTPA claims are assignable).
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Thus, the supreme court should adopt the reasoning of Thomes v. Porter
and Mahan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Hall and find that a DTPA claim survives
the death of the consumer regardless of the kind of damages sought. This
result creates harmony with the express purpose of the DTPA to protect
consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive trade practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty. To deny the survivability of a
DTPA claim "would serve to confound the purposes of the act" and allow
violators to escape the DTPA's enforcement mechanisms merely because the
4 33
consumer had the misfortune of dying.
L.

1.

MISCELLANEOUS

Exemptions from liability under the DTPA

4 34
As discussed above, the Austin court of appeals in Chapman v. Wilson
held that a dentist does not impliedly warrant that his or her services will be
performed in a good and workmanlike manner because this warranty does
not extend to professionals. 435 The court also held that even if such a warranty did exist, Chapman could not bring an action under the DTPA for Dr.
Wilson's breach thereof in light of the exemption found in section
12.01(a) 436 of the Medical Liability Act. 4 37 This provision exempts health
care providers from DTPA claims based on negligence. 4 38 The court held
that this exemption extended to this implied warranty because of the similarity between the negligence standard and the "good and workmanlike"
4 39
standard.
The court of appeals, however, held that section 12.01(a) of the Medical
Liability Act does not exempt health care providers from DTPA liability
based upon misrepresentations as opposed to negligence. 440 Wilson had argued for a complete exemption of health-care providers from liability under
the DTPA. The court held:
If the legislature had intended for § 12.01(a) to exempt health care
providers from every DTPA cause of action, irrespective of its basis,
then that intention could have been expressed in plain and specific lanFor this Court to stretch the exemption beyond negligence
guage ....
would, therefore, be to invade the field of the legislature. 44
While the court correctly held that DTPA claims against health care provid-

Thames, 761 S.W.2d at 594.
826 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
Id. at 217; see supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 12.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
Chapman, 826 S.W.2d at 219.
The statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no provision of Sections 17.41-17.63, Business
& Commerce Code, shall apply to physicians or health care providers as defined
in Section 1.03(3) of this Act, with respect to claims for damages for personal
injury or death resulting, or alleged to have resulted, from negligence on the part
of any physician or health care provider.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 12.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
439. Chapman, 826 S.W.2d at 218.
440. Id. at 219.
441. Id.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
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ers based on misrepresentations are not affected by article 4590i, section
12.01(a), because they are not based on negligence, it did "invade the field of
the legislature" by extending the exemption to warranty actions. An exclusion of warranty actions could have just as easily been "expressed in plain
and specific language." Furthermore, the court did not mention Eoff v. Hal
and CharliePeterson Foundation,44 2 where the exemption was determined to
be inapplicable "[s]ince the DTPA claim of appellants is that of implied warranty" rather than negligence. 44 3
2. The DTPA and breach of contract claims
In Enterprise-LaredoAssociates v. Hachar'sInc., 4 " Enterprise built a mall
in Laredo, Texas. They negotiated with Hachar's Inc., a department store,
to lease space. Enterprise drafted a form lease and both sides negotiated
changes. One revision consisted of the inclusion of Rider 12.21, a mostfavored nation provision, which related to the basic common area maintenance charge (CAM charge). In accordance with the lease, Enterprise billed
Hachar each month for the rent and the estimated CAM charge, and at the
end of each year, Enterprise recalculated the CAM charge and made any
needed adjustments. This procedure continued without problems for about
twelve years. In April 1987, Enterprise sent the 1986 year end CAM invoice
to Hachar. For the first time since the inception of the lease, Hachar exercised its right to seek an audit of the CAM charges, which disclosed that
Enterprise had not properly followed the most-favored nations clause in
Rider 12.21. After Hachar brought its discovery to Enterprise's attention,
Enterprise reviewed the documents and acknowledged that it had not
charged Hachar the lower CAM charge paid by Dillards department store.
Hachar, however, demanded that Enterprise calculate its charge based on
the lower CAM charge paid by Montgomery Ward because Ward was a
"mall tenant" pursuant to Hachar's interpretation of the lease agreement.
Enterprise denied Ward was a "mall tenant" since Ward owned its own
space in the mall. Thus, Ward paid such items as ad valorem taxes separately whereas the CAM charges for lessees included a pro rata share of ad
valorem taxes. The parties were unable to settle the CAM controversy and
Hachar filed suit. In its petition, Hachar alleged that Enterprise miscalculated its CAM charge and asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of
warranty, DTPA violations, and misrepresentations. After a nonjury trial,
the judge ruled that Enterprise should have based Hachar's CAM charge on
Ward's charge and awarded damages accordingly. The court found that
Hachar had been charged CAM charges in excess of those required by the
lease agreement, and that the most serious error was Enterprise's failure to
honor the express warranty in Rider 12.21. The trial court found that the
assessment and collection of the grossly excessive CAM charges and the con442. 811 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).

443. Id. at 195.
444. 839 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), writ denied per curiam, 843 S.W.2d 476

(Tex. 1992).
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tinuation to do so at every opportunity, took advantage of Hachar's lack of
knowledge of the facts to a grossly unfair degree. The trial court concluded
that Enterprise violated the DTPA by breaching the express warranty contained in Rider 12.21, by engaging in an unconscionable course of action in
violation of section 17.50(a)(3), and by making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the existence of or amount of price reductions in
violation of section 17.46(b)(1 1). On appeal, Enterprise contended that the
DTPA did not apply because the sole issue concerned a breach of contract
question between sophisticated, well-represented business people as to the
proper interpretation of Rider 12.21. The court of appeals held that "[a]
mere breach of contract allegation without more, is not a 'false, misleading,
or deceptive act' in violation of the DTPA." 445 Thus, the court found it
necessary to "differentiate a 'mere breach of contract claim' from a breach
which involves 'something more' in the way of a misrepresentation or fraud
claim to invoke the DTPA. ' 44 6 The court held that a case must contain
some element of overreaching or victimizing the unwary in order to create a
DTPA claim. 447 It found both Hachar and Enterprise to be sophisticated
business people well represented by counsel. 448 Furthermore, the evidence
presented during trial focused on the definition of "mall tenant" and which
department store Enterprise should base the CAM charge formula on. The
court of appeals held the dispute did not rise above the level of an interpretation dispute; therefore the DTPA, in the court's view, did not apply.449
Similarly, in Quitta v. Fossati,450 the court held that a landlord's refusal to
honor an oral representation that the tenants could perform services in ex45
change for rent was a mere breach of contract, not a DTPA violation. '
Calhoun, Quitta, and Blinker owned undivided one-third interests in a
house. Calhoun leased the house to the Fossatis. The lease called for
monthly rent of $600 and contained a handwritten clause allowing the tenants to provide $300 of improvements in exchange for their deposit. The
tenants claimed Calhoun later agreed to let them exchange work for rent.
Calhoun died, and the co-landlords denied the existence of this agreement.
The tenants left two weeks before the end of the lease, after the landlords
threatened eviction. The landlords then sued for rent, and the tenants counterclaimed for DTPA violations. The verdict was for the tenants, and the
landlords appealed. The court of appeals held that the evidence showed a
mere breach of contract, not a DTPA violation.4 52 The landlords cited a
number of cases for the proposition that a mere breach of contract is not
actionable under the DTPA. 453 The court stated: "It therefore becomes
critical to distinguish a mere breach of contract claim from a breach involv445. Id. at 828.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id.
Id. at 829.
Id.
Enterprise-Laredo,839 S.W.2d at 830.
808 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
Id. at 645.
Id.
Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Indus. Inc., 675 F.2d 745, 756 (5th Cir.
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ing something more in the way of fraud or misrepresentation sufficient to
invoke the DTPA.' '45 4 The court held this distinction was illustrated by
Leal v. Furniture Barn, Inc.,455 and Group Hospital Services v. One & Two
456
Brookriver Center.
In Leal the furniture store told the buyers they would forfeit all past payments unless it received an overdue payment by a certain date. The written
agreement between the parties did not provide for this threat of forfeiture.
The Leal court held this misrepresentation constituted a false statement of
fact regarding the buyers' rights under the agreement, and thus violated
DTPA section 17.46(b)(12), which prohibits "representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not
'457
have or involve, or which are prohibited by law."
In contrast, in Group Hospital, a landlord sued its tenant for breaching a
lease. The tenant argued that the landlord violated the DTPA by falsely
representing the terms of the lease and subsequent oral modifications of the
lease. The court held the dispute involved nothing more than contract inter45 8
pretation and not a DTPA violation.
The Quitta court concluded:
In summary, Leal holds that false statements of fact concerning a
party's rights under an unambiguous contract are actionable under
§ 17.46(b)(12), while Group Hospital holds that disagreements over the
interpretation of a contract with uncertain terms are not actionable
under this section. The distinction between these two cases, and between a DTPA violation and a breach of contract claim, properly lies
when an alternative interpretation of the contract is asserted, and the
dispute arises out of the performance of the contract. In such a case the
DTPA is not violated, and the legal
rights of the parties are governed by
459
traditional contract principles.
The Quitta court characterized the tenants' theory of the case as most
closely falling under DTPA section 17.46(b)(12). 460 The court characterized
their entire theory of recovery and defense as being based on the existence of
an oral modification to the lease and the landlords' allegedly wrongful attempt to enforce the written agreement. 46 1 The landlord's position was that
there was no oral modification, or that evidence of any such modification
was inadmissible and thus any agreement unenforceable. The court reasoned that the evidence showed only that the tenants made an unwritten
1982); La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984);
Ashford Dev. Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Svcs. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. 1983).
454. Quitta, 808 S.W.2d at 644.
455. 571 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. 1978).
456. Quitta, 808 S.W.2d at 644 (citing Group Hospital, 704 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1986, no writ)).

457. Leal, 571 S.W.2d at 865 (quoting DTPA § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon 1987)).
458. Group Hospital, 704 S.W.2d at 889.
459. Quitta, 808 S.W.2d at 644. The court qualified this by adding, "[i]ndependently ac-

tionable conduct under the DTPA would clearly fall outside the scope of our holding here."
Id. at 644 n.4.
460. Id. at 644-45.
461. Id.
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agreement with Calhoun, who died without telling her partners about it.462
The partners "simply sought performance of the written lease," while the
tenants "sought to prove the existence and character of additional terms to
the agreement. ' 463 The court found "[n]o evidence of overreaching or victimization,...

or unconscionable acts, or a false. misleading, or deceptive

act on the part of the appellants."' 464 The court concluded: "Thus, this case
merely involved traditional contract notions. '465 Thus, the court of appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment that the tenants take nothing on their DTPA claims. 466
The "mere breach of contract" argument was also made in Cronin v. Bacon. 4 67 In 1983, Barefoot Farms, a leading horse stud farm owned by
Cronin, advertised the availability of a champion stallion named Dandy Impression for breeding. Bacon entered into a stallion service contract with
Barefoot Farms for the breeding of his mare, Musette, to Dandy Impression.
In April 1986, the Appaloosa Horse Club notified Bacon that blood tests
showed that Dandy Impression did not sire the foal to which Musette gave
birth. Bacon then filed suit against Cronin alleging breach of contract, deceptive trade practices, fraud, and negligence. Bacon prevailed under his
DTPA claims and obtained a judgment for about $29,000 in actual damages,
$2,000 additional damages, and attorney's fees. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Cronin argued to the court of appeals
that this was a simple breach of contract case, and thus there could be no
finding of deceptive trade practices. Cronin argued that the only misrepresentation related to the performance of the stallion service contract. The
court rejected this argument holding that evidence indicated that Cronin
went outside the breach of contract and engaged in false, misleading, and
deceptive acts by representing that Musette had been bred to Dandy Impression, and failing to disclose that Musette had been bred to another
4 68
stallion.
When one looks at the history and language of the DTPA, it seems doubtful that the legislature intended a breach of contract to be a defense to a
DTPA suit, or that it intended that conduct breaching a contract be excluded from the DTPA. The legislature enacted the DTPA to give consumers a remedy without all the common law defenses and obstacles to recovery
that hindered a breach of contract or fraud claim. 469 Section 17.43 states

that the DTPA is intended to be cumulative of other remedies. 470 Because
the DTPA is independent of contract claims, there can be recovery under
the DTPA whether the consumer is, or is not, also entitled to recover for
462. Id. at 645.
463. Id.

464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. 837 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).

468. Id. at 268.
469. Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980).
470. DTPA § 17.43 (Vernon 1987).
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breach of contract. 47 1 That the existence of a breach of contract action does
not defeat a DTPA claim was the express holding in Vail v. Texas Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.:472 "The fact that the Vails have a breach of
contract action against Texas Farm does not preclude a cause of action
under the DTPA article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. '473 In other cases the
court has likewise recognized that contract recovery does not defeat DTPA
recovery. In Mayo v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,474 the court
held that the consumers were entitled to continue to pursue their cumulative
remedies under the DTPA even though they had recovered for breach of
contract. 475 In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Marshall476 the court based
DTPA misrepresentation liability on the insurer's written promises made
in
477
an agreed judgment, which the court treated the same as a contract.

If

the legislature meant for the DTPA to provide a remedy only when no such
remedy was available under other theories like breach of contract, the legislature would hardly have made the DTPA's remedies cumulative.
3.

The DTPA and default judgments

In Frame v. S-H, Inc.,478 the Fifth Circuit held that when a trial court
enters a default judgment, an allegation that the defendant acted knowingly
under the DTPA is taken as true and no evidence must be presented to the
court on such issue before treble damages can be assessed. 479 This lawsuit
was originally filed in 1986 by Suzanne Frame and two of her businesses
asserting RICO violations and fraud against Zepeda and two of his interests,
including S-H, Inc. Frame charged that Zepeda induced her to place over
$7 million with Zepeda for purposes of importing gray market perfumes.
Zepeda did not follow through on the perfume venture, said Frame, and the
$7 million disappeared. In June of 1987, a group of twenty-eight separate
investors, who had invested money in the perfume venture at Frame's urging, sought to intervene, alleging that Frame, in fact, had masterminded the
fraud. The district court allowed the intervention, made the investors plaintiffs, and redesignated Frame as a defendant. The investors alleged state and
federal securities infringements, RICO violations, fraud, and violations of
the DTPA. After about three years of tolerating Frame's delays, hiding documents, and failure to abide by discovery orders, the district court struck
471. See Balderama v. Western Casualty Life Ins. Co., 794 S.W.2d 84, 89-90 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 825 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1991) (court of appeals
allowed severance of breach of contract claim from DTPA claim because the essential elements to resolve in each claim were different and could be asserted independently of each
other); Honeywell, Inc. v. Imperial Condominium Ass'n, 716 S.W.2d 75, 78-79 (Tex. App.Dallas 1986, no writ) (court rejected "mere breach of contract" defense and held Honeywell
liable under the DTPA for making false representations in contract).
472. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).

473. Id.at 136.
474. 711 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. 1986).
475. Id. at 6-7.
476. 724 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1987).

477. Id. at 772.
478.

967 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1992).

479. Id. at 206.
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Frame's pleadings and entered a final judgment in favor of the investors.
Without conducting an evidentiary hearing on damages, the court assigned a
dollar award of actual damages to the investors and trebled that amount
under the DTPA.
On appeal, Frame argued that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing on damages before rendering a final judgment against her.
The Fifth Circuit held that when a default judgment is rendered, a court
should hold an evidentiary hearing on damages unless the damages are for a
liquidated amount. 480 The investors argued that the damages were liquidated because they were based on the face amounts of promissory notes.
The court held that the face amounts of the notes did not represent a certain
computation of the actual damages suffered because the evidence indicated
that some portion of the investors' money was returned to them. 48' Therefore, while the court held that the striking of the pleadings and the entry of
the default judgment was proper, the court remanded for an evidentiary
hearing on damages. 48 2 The court held, however, on remand, that the district court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
knowing conduct, which triggers the treble damages provision of the
DTPA.483 The court held that, unlike questions of actual damages, which

must be proven in a default situation, conduct on which liability for treble
48 4
damages is based, may be taken as true as a consequence of the default.
The court's decision that a defendant admits to "knowing" conduct in a
default situation is contrary to several Texas court of appeals' decisions,
which have held that evidence of the defendant's knowledge must be
presented in a default situation before additional damages can be assessed. 48 5
II. TEXAS FREE ENTERPRISE AND ANTITRUST ACT
In Caller-Times Publishing Co. v. Triad Communications, Inc., 486 the

Texas Supreme Court announced the test for predatory pricing in violation
487
of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act (Texas Antitrust Act).
Triad published Wheels & Keels, a circular that featured display and classified advertisements primarily for automobiles and boats. The Caller-Times
published the only major daily newspaper in Nueces County (Corpus
Christi) and the 11 surrounding counties. Claiming that the Caller-Times
drove it out of business by offering special, below cost rates to Wheels &
Keels customers to induce them to advertise instead with the Caller-Times,
480. Id. at 204.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Frame, 967 F.2d at 205.
484. Id.
485. Sunrizon Homes, Inc. v. Fuller, 747 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ
denied); Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); First Nat'l Bank v. Shockley, 663 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1983, no writ).
486. 826 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1992); see also 11 TEX. CONSUMER L. REP. (Tex. Law Letter,
Inc.) 3 (Jan. 1992); 11 TEX. CONSUMER L. REP. (Tex. Law Letter, Inc.) 83 (Apr. 1992).
487. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN., § 15.01-15.51 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993).
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Triad sued the Caller-Times for monopolization and predatory pricing practices in violation of section 15.01 of the Business and Commerce Code. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Triad and the trial court trebled the jury's
488
damage award.
The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that predatory pricing occurs when
the defendant (1) sets prices below its average total costs, and (2) exhibits
subjective or objective characteristics of predatory conduct. 48 9 The court of
appeals found sufficient evidence of subjective predatory intent in the Caller490
Times' practice of offering special deals to Wheels and Keels customers.
That these "special deals" were 50 percent off the Caller-Times' regular rates
when its margin of profit was only 12 percent provided sufficient evidence, in
49
the court of appeals' view, of pricing below total costs. '
The supreme court reversed, and, after reviewing the predatory pricing
opinions of the several federal courts of appeal under the federal antitrust
laws, announced the test for predatory pricing under the Texas Antitrust
Act:
(1) predatory pricing must be "economically feasible;"
and either
(2)(a) the price charged is below "average variable cost;"
or
(2)(i) there are substantial barriers to market entry;
(ii) the seller is charging a price below the short-run profit maximizing price and the average total cost; and
(iii) the benefits of the seller's price depended on its tendency to dis492
cipline or eliminate competition.
The supreme court disposed of the case under the second element of the
test. To begin with, the court found no evidence that the Caller-Times
priced its advertising below average variable cost,4 93 which the court "de'494
fined as the costs that vary with changes in output divided by the output.

488. Triad also received favorable jury findings on its alternative theory, intentional interference with contract relations, but had judgment entered on its favorable antitrust findings
since that produced the greater recovery.
489. Caller-Times Publishing Co. v. Triad Communications, 791 S.W.2d 163, 170 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1990), rev'd, 826 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1992).
490. Id. at 170.
491. Id.
492. Caller-Times, 826 S.W.2d at 588.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 583. Although the court did not further explain the term, "variable costs" are
typically considered to be those costs incurred directly in the manufacture of a product, which
vary with the number of units manufactured, such as the cost of materials used in the product,
labor directly used in its manufacture, and perunit license fees. Variable costs are distinguished from fixed costs that remain constant regardless of the number of units produced. The
"average variable cost" of a product is the sum of all variable costs divided by the number of
units produced. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, PredatoryPricingand Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700 (1975).
The court did recognize, however, that whether a cost is "fixed" or "variable" may be a
disputed fact issue for the jury and that the jury, in deciding which, may consider, but is not
bound by, the defendant's characterization of its own costs. Furthermore, the court noted that
it is the "average variable cost" for the "relevant product market," consisting of both geographic market area and the product market, that is to be determined and that "[p]roducts are
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The court stated that "[w]hen considering claims of predatory pricing, the
trier of fact must have sufficiently precise cost information to allow it to
determine average variable cost."'4 95 Triad's proof, in the form of the defendant's publisher's testimony that the Caller-Times' profit margin was approximately 12 percent, shows only "'vigorous competition' . . . clearly not
prohibited under antitrust statutes. '496 Next, the court denied Triad "refuge" in the exception to the second part of the test because Triad had failed
to produce evidence of substantial barriers of entry to the market. 497
Having found Triad's case wanting under the second part of the test, the
court declined to address the first, that is, whether the Caller-Times had an
objectively reasonable expectation that it could recoup its losses from predatory pricing by charging higher prices later. The court did, however, indicate some of the factors that would be relevant to this inquiry:
We are not faced with the question of what factors a court should consider to determine whether a seller will have an objectively reasonable
expectation of recouping its losses. Relevant factors must be determined on a case by case basis. While we neither endorse every factor on
this list nor exclude any other factor, we anticipate that the following
factors would be relevant: the type of goods or services in question; the
economic condition of the predator; relative market strength of the
seller; the number of competitors in the relevant market; nature of barriers to market entry; market demand; and the name recognition of the
49 8
seller's products.
The court justified requiring proof of the "economic feasibility" of predatory pricing on consumer protection considerations.
Low prices for consumers are an ultimate goal of the Texas Antitrust
Act. If the market structure does not allow recoupment later, then consumers benefit from a period of low prices. There is no down side because, by definition, if the market does not allow later recoupment the
monopolist cannot charge higher prices later. Consumers cannot lose if
499
the market does not allow recoupment.
The court stated flatly that "subjective intent of a seller should not be a
factor in determining whether its prices are predatory." 5°° Because, according to the court, "'predatory pricing is difficult to distinguish from vigorous
price competition' and subjective evidence blurs the distinction[,] . . .juries
may 'erroneously condemn competitive behavior.' "501 Moreover, said the
court, subjective intent is so "vague" a standard that "business will tend to
generally in the same market if they are reasonably interchangeable." Caller-Times, 826
S.W.2d at 583, n.13 (citation omitted).
495. Caller-Times, 826 S.W.2d at 588.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 582 n.7.
499. Id. at 582. The evidence necessary to establish "economic feasibility" in a predatory
pricing case is before the United States Supreme Court in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.), cert. granted sub. nom. Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S.Ct. 490 (1992).
500. Caller-Times, 826 S.W.2d at 587.
501. Id. (quoting Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1359 (8th Cir. 1989)).
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err on the side of keeping prices high and consumers will be the ultimate
losers.., contrary to the purpose stated in section 15.04 of the Texas Antitrust Act[,]" which is to protect consumers against unjustifiably high
50 2
prices.
In his dissent, Justice Doggett, joined by Justice Mauzy, argued that by
eliminating evidence of subjective intent and restricting predatory pricing
analysis to cost, price, and profit factors, the court adopted a test permissive
of predatory activity. 50 3 Justice Doggett faulted the court's use, but lack of
explanation, of vague terms such as "substantial barrier to entry," "shortrun profit maximizing cost," and "average variable cost." 5°4 He reasoned
that the court's test will only encourage costly litigation, involving economists and accountants "dueling over largely arbitrary and potentially incomprehensible numbers."5 0 5 Furthermore, Justice Doggett argued that the
majority's test discourages legal representation due to cost of data and the
uncertainty of the data prior to suit. 5°6 Justice Doggett argued for application of the rule of reason, evaluating the totality of the circumstances, and
50 7
considering both economic effect and subjective intent of the conduct.
Such a test would, in Justice Doggett's view, foster consideration of facts
involving the market and the defendant's market position, conduct, and ultimately, the defendant's intent.50 8 "[T]he only way to tell predatory pricing
from healthy competition is by motive." 5°9 Any other approach would allow defendants to escape liability by simply maintaining records that demonstrate pricing above a self-determined average variable cost or short-run
profit maximizing cost.5 10 Justice Doggett argued further that the court's
analysis will discourage criminal antitrust prosecutions by eliminating the
element of culpable intent."' 1 Furthermore, without evidence of intent, the
court has extinguished a plaintiff's ability to recover treble damages where
51 2
there is evidence of "willful or flagrant" conduct.
In Times Herald PrintingCo. v. A.H. Belo Corp.,"1 3 the court of appeals
stated the question posed and its answer as follows:
The principal question posed by this appeal is whether anticompetitive
502. Id. Section 15.04 states:
The purpose of this Act is to maintain and promote economic competition in
trade and commerce occurring wholly or partly within the State of Texas and to
provide the benefits of that competition to consumers in the state. The provisions
of this Act shall be construed to accomplish this purpose and shall be construed in
harmony with federal judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust
statutes to the extent consistent with this purpose.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN., § 15.04 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
503. Caller-Times, 826 S.W.2d at 598 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
504. Id. at 592-593 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
505. Id. at 592.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 599.
508. Id. at 599-600.
509. Id. at 600.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 601.
512. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(a)(1).
513. 820 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1991, no writ).
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conduct of a defendant who attempts to achieve monopoly power in a
relevant market may be redeemed by a legitimate business purpose.
When that conduct involves a nonprice vertical restraint, the answer is
no. Rather, the proper approach is to apply a "rule of reason" standard, allowing the trier of facts to weigh all of the evidence to determine
whether the legitimate business justifications of a defendant's conduct
outweigh its threat to competition or whether the conduct unreasonably
restrained trade. In the present case, the jury was incorrectly instructed
that to violate antitrust laws the defendants' conduct must have no legitimate business purpose. However, we hold the error to be harmless
because, in response to a separate question, in which the jury was properly instructed to employ a "rule of reason" analysis, the jury found
5 14
that the defendants' conduct did not unreasonably restrain trade.
After a twenty year relationship with the Dallas Times Herald, Universal
Press Syndicate (UPS) suddenly canceled the Herald's right to print twentysix UPS features, including "Dear Abby," Erma Brombeck's humor column,
"Doonesbury," and "The Far Side" comics, columns, and commentaries.
The cancellation occurred shortly after UPS signed a five-year, $1 million
joint venture agreement with Belo to produce and distribute television programs and promotions featuring UPS creations, and an agreement providing
the Dallas Morning News with the exclusive right to current UPS features
and right of first refusal on all future UPS features. The News quickly commissioned an advertising campaign targeted at Herald readers trumpeting
the transfer of the features to the News. The News had dominated the Herald in the market with approximately sixty percent of the daily circulation
and approximately seventy percent of the advertising. This large a market
share vested the News with such "monopoly power" that, in the opinion of
an expert economist, "its aggressive pursuit of a competitor's resources,
while 'perfectly normal in an ordinary context,' would pose a threat to
competition." 515
Pursuant to the claim under the Texas Antitrust Act, the jury was asked
the following question with accompanying instructions:
Did A.H. Belo Corporation or the Dallas Morning News Company
willfully attempt to achieve monopoly power in a relevant market or
markets?
An "attempt to achieve monopoly power" occurs when a party has a
specific intent to achieve monopoly power in a relevant market or markets; it engages in exclusionary or restrictive conduct in furtherance of
its specific intent; and there is a dangerous probability that it will
achieve monopoly power in the relevant market.
"Willfully" . . . means to attempt to acquire, to acquire or to maintain monopoly power by exclusionary or restrictive conduct, as distinguished from attempting to acquire, acquiring or maintaining monopoly
power by having a superior product or by superior business skill, or as a
result of historical accident.
514. Id. at 208.
515. Id. at 209.
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Conduct is exclusionary or restrictive when its benefits depend on
eliminating or crippling competition so as to enable the actor to reap
the benefits of monopoly power in the aftermath. Exclusionary or restrictive conduct is conduct without legitimate business purpose
that
51 6
makes sense only because it eliminates or cripples competition.
The trial court denied the Herald's objection to this instruction and refused to submit the following instruction tendered by the Herald and suggested by the American Bar Association's Sample Jury Instructions in Civil
51 7
Antitrust Cases:
"Exclusionary or restrictive" conduct is defined as unreasonable acts or
practices that have the actual or reasonably foreseeable effect of substantially impairing competition in a relevant market in an unnecessarily restrictive way or of destroying competition. It is not necessary
that such conduct be unlawful in and of itself, apart from its effect in
achieving or maintaining monopoly power. 518
When the jury deadlocked on the question after several days of deliberations, the trial court instructed the jury that "[i]f the only purpose of conduct
is to eliminate or cripple competition, it is exclusionary or restrictive. If
conduct has a legitimate business purpose, it is not exclusionary or restrictive." 51 9 The Herald objected to the instruction and tendered an alternative,
which the trial court rejected: "Such conduct is without legitimate business
purpose if it is used to acquire or maintain monopoly power by means other
' 520
than fair competition.
The court of appeals disagreed with the News' contention that if there
were any business justification, no antitrust violation was possible. This was
true, conceded the court, in cases of unilateralconduct, such as a unilateral
refusal to deal. The court noted:
In the present case, the Times Herald alleges not a unilateralrefusal to
deal but a bilateralagreement. Such an arrangement is characterized as
"vertical" because UPS and [Belo and the News] are "at different levels
of the market structure." Because the agreement allegedly involves
concerted action on nonprice restrictions, it must be judged under a
"rule of reason" analysis to determine whether it constitutes an unreasonable restraint on competition .... Taken to its logical extreme, the
business justification defense might allow [Belo and the News] to prevent the Times Herald from being printed at all by monopolizing other
resources as well, so long as its contracts with suppliers made some
business sense. The trial court endorsed such reasoning by instructing
the jury that a legitimate business purpose would redeem conduct that
might otherwise be exclusionary or restrictive. Further, the trial court
516. Id. at 209-10.
517. ABA Sample Jury Instructions in Civil Antitrust Cases C-20, C-96 (1987).
518. Times Herald, 820 S.W.2d at 210.
519. Id.
520. Id. The Herald also tendered as another alternative from 3 PHILLIP AREEDA AND
DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 626b at 78 (1978): "Thus, 'exclusionary' comprehends at the most behavior that not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but
also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way." This, too, was rejected by the trial court.
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erred by rejecting the Times Herald's alternative instructions focusing
on "unnecessarily restrictive" conduct. The "unnecessarily restrictive"
standard contemplates the more common-sense "rule of reason" analysis allowing the jury to weigh all of the evidence to determine whether
the business justifications of a defendant's conduct are sufficient to out52 1
weigh its threat to competition.

The court found the trial court's error in the charge harmless, however,
because the jury was charged on the rule of reason in answering another
question that it felt was identical in substance to the one that lacked the
correct instruction. 522 The question inquired whether UPS and the News
had entered into a "contract or conspiracy ...that willfully and unreasonably restrained trade. '5 23 The trial court's instruction told the jury that, in
determining whether the conduct "unreasonably restrained trade," it should
consider the nature of the industry, facts peculiar to the industry, nature of
the restraint and its effect, the history of the restraint, and the reasons for
adopting the particular practice that is alleged to be a restraint. The appellate court felt that this question was identical in substance to the erroneous
question and that, therefore, the jury's negative answer to it rendered the
24
5

error harmless.

The rule of reason was applied during the Survey period in a case involving alleged violations of the pre-1983 Texas Antitrust laws. In Cranfil v.
Scott & Fetzer Co., 525 Cranfill was a distributor for the Kirby Co., a division

of the Scott & Fetzer Co. The distributorship agreement outlined Cranfill's
primary area of responsibility to include Sherman, Texas and surrounding
counties, but Cranfill was allowed to and did sell Kirby products outside this
area. The agreement also included an Installation Service and Administration fee (ISA) whereby Kirby would charge an additional $38 from each
distributor per vacuum sold. If the product was sold within the distributor's
designated area $30 would be returned to that distributor. Otherwise, the
distributor with the nearest office to the customer would receive the $30,
provided the non-selling distributor contacted the customer and offered the
necessary service. Each distributor was free to charge whatever price he or
she desired. The Cranfill distributor agreement required the distributor to
provide accurate customer and warranty information, but did not require
any pricing information. Failure to do so was cause for cancellation of the
distributorship agreement.
Cranfill admitted to submitting false sales and warranty information in
violation of the distributorship agreement. As a result, Kirby canceled the
distributorship. Cranfill sued, alleging that Kirby's actions were in retaliation for Cranfill's failure to abide with Kirby's purported anti-competitive
521. Times Herald, 820 S.W.2d 206 at 212-13 (citation omitted).
522. Id. at 213.
523. Id.
524. Id. The court also reviewed the evidence and concluded it sufficient to support the
jury's negative answer to the conspiracy question. Id. at 214-15.
525. 773 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Tex. 1991); see also 11 TEX. CONSUMER L. REP. (Tex. Law
Letter, Inc.) 27 (Feb. 1992).
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policies violating both federal and Texas antitrust laws. Specifically, Cranfill
claimed Kirby restricted the territory in which she could sell, canceled the
distributorship agreement for Cranfill's failure to comply with an alleged
pricing program whereby Kirby restricted advertisements of prices below
suggested manufacturer's price, and refused to deal with Cranfill as a dealer
instead of distributor. The district court granted summary judgment against
Cranfill on her antitrust claims.
The district court labeled Cranfill's antitrust claims as alleged vertical
price fixing. Still, the court found no violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act in Kirby's advertisement restrictions because there was no evidence of
an agreement to fix prices. Cranfill openly admitted she could charge any
price for the Kirby product that she desired. Furthermore, evidence demonstrated that Kirby never requested nor received any customer information
relating to prices.
The appellate court found no violation in the ISA fee and its resultant
territorial restraints. 526 Nor was there any problem with the alleged actions
taken by Kirby to avoid dealing with Cranfill as a dealer. Relying on case
precedent upholding such restrictions, the court labeled the ISA as an alleged vertical nonprice restraint and determined that Cranfill could succeed
only by demonstrating that such restraint had an anticompetitive effect on
the market. 527 The court imposed a rule of reason standard in weighing all
the circumstances to determine whether the restrictive practice was prohibited. 528 The court concluded Kirby did not violate antitrust laws since its
actions in no way affected interbrand competition. 529 Cranfill admitted to
intense competition among five different vacuum brands within her territory
alone. Furthermore, evidence that Kirby maintained only six to eight percent of the market share in the United States suggested that Kirby lacked the
requisite market power to affect competition.
The court found summary judgment appropriate against all of Cranfill's
claims under the pre-1983 Texas statutory antitrust laws. 530 Cranfill argued
the ISA fee implemented exclusive territories or somehow restrained trade.
Yet, the evidence suggested otherwise in that distributors were free to sell
anywhere. The court noted that the ISA geographic restrictions were justified as a means of ensuring total market saturation by distributors and complete customer relations. 531 Furthermore, there was no discrimination
among distributors. The court relied on Ford Motor Co. v. State532 in upholding the manufacturer's ability to impose reporting requirements and to
choose with whom to deal.

526.
527.
528.
529.

Cranfill, 773 F. Supp. at 952.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 954.

530. Id. at 958.
531. Id. at 956.
532. 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W.2d 230 (1943).

